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INTERLOCUTORY APPELLATE REVIEW VIA
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT
BENNETT FEIGENBAUM*

The delays inherent in appellate review long have been a source of
discomfort to the profession. As a result, resourceful counsel have
developed all manner of practices over the years to reduce appellate
delay. Among these has been the utilization of the extraordinary writ
as a means of interlocutory appellate review.
That such is not the normal function of the extraordinary writ either
historically or logically is beyond dispute. Nevertheless, further resort to writ practice is inevitable and imminent. As the backlog in the
state supreme court increases each term, the problem of delay becomes more acute, and lawyers are faced with mounting pressures to
obtain reasonably speedy appellate review.
Regrettably, the decisional law is in a chaotic state. The confusion
lies not with determination of the merits of each controversy for the
substantive law remains constant. The more than bothersome problem
is whether the act of the trial court is such that it should be examined
by the appellate court by means of an extraordinary writ rather than
in the normal course by appeal (or certiorari).
The extraordinary writs to be examined are certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition. In general, the writs will not lie unless an official has
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law.'
Although such writs properly may be directed against nonjudicial
officers, this article is limited to discussion of writs directed against
* Member of the bars of the District of Columbia (1958) and the State of Washington (1959).
'Certiorri: RCW 7.16.040. Mandamus: RCW 7.16.160-.170. Prohibition: RCW
7.16.290-.300. See the cases annotated under each statute.
I
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trial judges since the latter result as a practical matter in a review of
a determination made during the course of (or immediately prior to)
a trial. In making a realistic appraisal of these cases one must recognize that a form of appellate review is being evaluated, and the validity
of the holdings must be measured by the criterion of their contribution
to efficient appellate practice.
Also excluded are those cases in which the use of certiorari is specially authorized by statute or by the court,2 and those cases in which
certiorari is granted on the ground that the law provides no right of
appeal at all, even at the conclusion of the entire proceeding.3 The
former cases are excluded because the special authorization amounts
to a policy determination that in such cases an interlocutory appellate
review is desirable. The latter cases are excluded because such use
of the writ is a mere matter of form differing not at all from appeal
of a final judgment.
In this article no significance is attached to the type of writ requested or granted because the supreme court has wisely adopted the
practice of treating applications for extraordinary writs interchangeably, granting the writ to which the applicant may be entitled without
regard to how the application is characterized.4
It has already been stated that a writ will not lie unless (1) the
trial court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction, and (2) the
remedy at law is inadequate. This article deals with the application
of these two requirements. For convenience of presentation they will
be considered in reverse order.
ADEQUACY OF THE. REmEDY AT LAW

In some of the significant cases to be analyzed, the holdings seem
to be that in certain circumstances (to be discussed at length below)
the remedy by appeal is per se inadequate. In these cases it is difficult
to infer from the language whether it was being held that in such circumstances the writ will issue without consideration of the adequacy
of the remedy by appeal, or whether the remedy by appeal was in
fact considered, but found wanting. In some cases the language of
See, e.g., In re Woods v. Rhay, 54 Wn.2d 36, 45, 338 P.2d 332, 338 (1959).
In re a Minor, 39 Wn.2d 744, 238 P.2d 914 (1951) (review of juvenile court proceedings).
4 State ex rel. Strom v. City of Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 858, 314 P.2d 921 (1957) ; State
ex rel. Cheson v. Superior Court, 22 Wn.2d 947, 157 P.2d 991 (1945). See also State
cx rel. Verd v. Superior Court, 31 Wn.2d 625, 198 P.2d 663 (1948); State ex rel.
Antonsen v. Superior Court, 29 Wn.2d 725, 189 P.2d 219 (1948) ; State ex rel. Burkhard v. Superior Court, 11 Wn.2d 600, 120 P.2d 477 (1941) ; State ex rel. Crockett v.
Sutton, 159 Wash. 307, 293 Pac. 469 (1930).
2

3
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the opinion lends support to both positions. It is deemed necessary
to make this distinction for purposes of analysis in discovering the
circumstances that make the remedy by appeal inadequate, and
whether indeed it is necessary in all cases that the remedy at law be
inadequate. Accordingly, the language in the cases bearing on each
question will be segregated and discussed in the appropriate section.
The unavoidable consequence is that the reader interested in a named
case, rather than an issue, may be required to look in more than one
section for a complete discussion of the case.
WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ADEQUATE REw[EDY BY APPEAL?

The statutes and the common law require as a condition precedent
to the issuance of an extraordinary writ that the remedy by appeal be
inadequate. The question of adequacy of the remedy by appeal is not
dependent upon any general rule, but upon the facts of each particular
case, and its determination rests in the sound discretion of the court.5
However, as might be expected, from the cases have emerged certain
guidelines to aid the lawyer deciding whether to seek relief by writ,
and to aid the court in the sound exercise of its judicial discretion.
In general the delays, expenses and annoyances incident to an
appeal do not affect the adequacy thereof.8 There must be something
in the nature of the action as a consequence of which the fruits of the
litigation or some manifest right would be lost by awaiting the result
of an appeal.7 Typical examples are the disbursement of estate funds
by an administrator during the pendency of the litigation,' and expiration of a contract right before an appeal could be determined.9
The reasons underlying the judicial preference for review by appeal
5 State ex rel. O'Brien v. Police Court, 14 Wn.2d 340, 128 P2d 332 (1942).
6 State ex rel. Godfrey v. Superior Court, 111 Wash. 101, 189 Pac. 256 (1920);
State ex rel. LaFurgey v. Superior Court, 47 Wash. 154, 91 Pac. 639 (1907) ; State
ex rel. Young v. Denny, 34 Wash. 56, 74 Pac. 1021 (1904) ; State ex rel. Carrau v.
Superior Court, 30 Wash. 700, 71 Pac. 648 (1903).
State ex rel. Schlosberg v. Superior Court, 106 Wash. 320, 179 Pac. 865 (1919);
State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 877 (1905); State ex rel.
City of West Seattle v. Superior Court, 36 Wash. 566, 79 Pac. 29 (1905); State ex rel.
Smith v. Superior Court, 26 Wash. 278, 66 Pac. 385 (1901) ; State ex rel. Barbo v.
Hadley, 20 Wash. 520, 56 Pac. 29 (1899). Compare two cases taking seemingly opposing views on whether dispossession pending appeal is such a loss of a manifest right:
State ex reL Mower v. Superior Court, 43 Wn.2d 123, 260 P.2d 355 (1953) (yes);
State ex rel. Barnes v. Superior Court, 96 Wash. 581, 165 Pac. 493 (1917) (no).
8In re Guye's Estate, 54 Wash. 264, 103 Pac. 25 (1909) ; State ex rel. Speckart v.
Superior Court, 48 Wash. 141, 92 Pac. 942 (1907) ; In re Sullivan's Estate, 36 Wash.
217, 78 Pac. 945 (1904). But cf., State ex rel. Kempf v. Superior Court, 151 Wash.
289, 275 Pac. 694 (1929) ; State ex rel. Warren v. Ayer, 17 Wash. 127, 49 Pac. 226
(1897) ; State ex e. MrcLaughlin v. Lichtenberg, 4 Wash. 231, 29 Pac. 999 (1892).
9 State ex rel. P.U.D. Dist. No. 1 v. Schwab, 40 Wn.2d 814, 246 P.2d 1081 (1952);
Bayha v. P.U.D. Dist. No. 1, 2 Wn.2d 85, 97 P.2d 614 (1939).

44SHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

are two: (1) The orderly and efficient administration of justice demands no interference in the ordinary course of litigation, and a single
appeal rather than multiple piecemeal appeals;1" and (2) when causes
are regularly appealed, they are presented to the court by formal
briefs, which are more carefully prepared by the attorneys, and which
the court has an opportunity to examine with more deliberation than
is the case with writs.11
A survey of the application of these sound and presumably well
established judicial policies reveals an appalling lack of consistency
among cases with common fact patterns. These cases will be discussed
below under appropriate topic headings immediately following the
section dealing with two important cases on delay and expense in
general.
Delay and Expense - In General. It has already been stated
that the delay and expense incident to an appeal do not affect the adequacy thereof. The soundness of this rule is hardly open to question.
The reason for the rule was succinctly enunciated in an early case as
follows: "[A]I1 litigation is fraught with vexatious delay and incidental expenses, and if this alone were sufficient to justify extraordinary writs of this character, the effective method of appeal would soon
grow into disuse."''

Notwithstanding the sound basis supporting the rule, in a number
of cases the delay or expense arising in the ordinary course of litigation appears to have been a controlling or contributing factor in the
granting of a writ.1 No good purpose would be served by an analysis
of those decisions which do not include much discussion of the propriety of considering delay and expense as factors affecting the adequacy of the remedy. Two cases however do deserve special attention.
In State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court 4 a writ of prohibition was
granted to restrain a superior court from hearing a cause after that
court had refused a change of venue to the county of defendants' resi10 Maybury v. City of Seattle, 53 Wn.2d 716, 336 P.2d 878 (1959) ; State ex rel. Lyon
v. Police Court, 53 Wash. 361, 101 Pac. 1082 (1909).
11 State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 877 (1905) ; State
ex rel. Light Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Wash. 502, 55 Pac. 933 (1899).
12 State ex reL. City of West Seattle v. Superior Court, 36 Wash. 566, 570, 79 Pac.
29, 30 (1905).
13 Alaska Airlines v. Molitor, 43 Wn.2d 657, 263 P.2d 276 (1953); State ex rel.
_M[ower v. Superior Court, 43 Wn.2d 123, 260 P.2d 355 (1953) ; State ex rel. Wilson
v. Kay, 164 Wash. 685, 4 P.2d 498 (1931) ; State ex rel. Waterman v. Superior Court,
127 Wash. 37, 220 Pac. 5 (1923) ; State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court, 97 Wash.
358, 166 Pac. 630 (1917) ; State ex rel. Wolferman v. Superior Court, 8 Wash. 591,
36 Pac. 443 (1894). See also Graham v. Graham, 40 Wn.2d 64, 240 P.2d 564 (1952).
14 97 Wash. 358, 166 Pac. 630 (1917).
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dence. For present purposes we are interested in the portions of the
opinion supporting the holding that the remedy by appeal was inadequate.
The terms "speedy and adequate," when applied to remedies, mean,
or ought tomean, a remedy adequate and timely to review the particular error relied on, and not merely a remedy which depends upon
a proper determination of the issues as defined by the pleadings, and
such questions of practice and procedure as may arise in bringing the
case to issue, and trying out the facts.
Wherefore it may be said, where there is a right to a trial in a
particular place, which right is independent of the issue as tendered
by the complaint, an adequate remedy means a trial in the first instance by a court having jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits.
To rule otherwise would bring us to a holding that, although the
right to a change depended in no way upon a controverted fact of
residence, the defendant would have to meet the delay and expense of
a trial, and possibly suffer a judgment (if he have clever counsel he
would stand mute and make no defense to the merits), which we would
be willing to sustain if we were free to do so. Before we could even
consider the merit of the case, we would have to decide the question
of venue, or the question of jurisdiction, and do that which ought to
have been done in the first place, remand, with directions to change
the venue and retry the case; and for the reason that the court did not
have jurisdiction. If we would have to so hold on appeal, why should
we not say so now, the record being before us in the same form as it
would come on appeal?
It requires no argument to convince the writer that such a situation
would be intolerable, and such as the law has sought to avoid by providing a means whereby the appellate court can keep the stream of
justice flowing between its proper banks. By this proceeding, we may
presume that one appeal will settle the merits of the case whatever the
judgment of the court below may be. If we deny the writ, we may
assume that in a fair proportion of the cases, two appeals, one abortive
and the other to the merit, will be necessary. This has always been
the rule where the court below has ordered the venue of a case to
another country. 15
The opinion makes two significant arguments. First, it is said that
the remedy must be speedy and adequate to review the particular
error relied upon, not merely to review the entire proceedings. Second,
it is asked why a holding that the court did not have jurisdiction should
be deferred until the cause arrives by appeal when a probable result of
6
such deferral would be an abortive trial and two appeals.1
15 Id. at 362-63, 166 Pac. at 631-32.
16 See also State ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court,
26 Wn.2d 740, 175 P.2d 640 (1946) ; State ex rel. Waterman v. Superior Court, 127

Wash. 37, 220 Pac. 5 (1923).
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Is it true that the remedy must be speedy and adequate to review
the particular error relied upon? Clearly, no. If it were so, appeal
would seldom be adequate to remedy alleged errors occurring during
pretrial, or in the early stages of the trial. Following this line of
thought further, adequacy of the remedy by appeal would also become
dependent upon the probable length of the trial, and the backlog in
the dockets of the trial and appellate courts. But these are delays and
expenses incident to the normal course of litigation. They are inconveniences outweighed by the judicial policies in favor of uninterrupted
proceedings at the trial level, and a single appellate review of the
cause. The first argument in the Martin case would seem to be invalid.
Why should the appellate court defer a holding that the trial court
had no jurisdiction when to do so would result in an abortive trial and
two appeals? This rhetorical question demands our consideration for
it is often posed in arguments in support of granting extraordinary
relief. And even more important, it is suspected that this position
forms the inarticulated basis for decisions granting a writ when the
reasons stated in the opinion are patently without support in logic or
case law.
The short answer to the oft-posed question is that the state statutes
and the common law say so. In fact, the question was answered thusly
by the supreme court many years before it was asked. In State ex rel.
Reed v. Jones17 appears the following:
It was suggested on the argument by the learned counsel for the
petitioners that an appeal would be futile in this case, because the
same questions would be presented on appeal that the court is now
called upon to determine. But the fact that the same questions can be
so presented is a sufficient reason for withholding the writ, as the above
authorities and many others that might be cited abundantly show.",
To hold that the appellate court should step in immediately whenever
the trial court is proceeding without jurisdiction is to ignore the fact
that the law requires as a requisite for the issuance of a writ not only
that the trial court be acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
but also that the remedy at law be inadequate. If the remedy at law
is always inadequate when the court is acting without jurisdiction,
then the inadequacy-of-the-remedy requirement is reduced to mere
surplusage.
Furthermore, wholly aside from the statutory mandate, the "why
172 Wash. 662, 27 Pac. 452 (1891).

IsId. at 666, 27 Pac. at 454.
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not say it now" argument fails because it is based upon the dubious
premise that the trial judge is always, or at least usually, in error.
Any interlocutory appellate review can be sustained if it be assumed
that the trial court was in error. Why must the relator endure the delay
and expense of an abortive trial and an extra appeal when the trial
court has erroneously determined that the service of process was sufficient, or has erroneously admitted certain evidence during trial? Of
course, the answer is that the question whether a writ is the proper
mode of review must be decided before a decision on the merits is
reached.
A more reasonable premise is that the trial court has probably
ruled correctly. Then, all other things being equal, in a majority of the
cases the only result of granting extraordinary relief would be an
interruption of the-trial proceedings, and an added burden upon the
appellate court. Therein lies the real evil of the holding in the Martin
case. Trial counsel in other causes, likewise convinced that the trial
court erred, are encouraged to seek relief by writ. The benefit resulting from correction of a trial judge prior to trial in the case under
consideration is obvious, but it cannot justify the resultant overburdening of the appellate court with numerous applications for writs
in other causes by other counsel who have erroneously concluded that
the trial court is in error in these other causes. Taking the long-range
view, the occasional burden upon a litigant of enduring the delay and
expense of an abortive trial is far outweighed by considerations of
orderly and efficient administration of justice at the appellate level by
discouraging piecemeal appeals.
The other case deserving of special attention is State ex rel. Wilson
v. Kay."9 There the trial judge orally stated at the conclusion of the
case that he would find for the plaintiff in the sum of $250. However,
he died before the formal findings were submitted. His successor
entered appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and signed
a judgment. The defendant applied for a writ of certiorari on the
ground that a judge who has not heard the case has no power to so
act. It was held, that the writ would lie because the remedy at law
was inadequate. In order to reach this conclusion it was necessary for
the court to distinguish several cases. Most of those cases are not
distinguishable on the grounds assigned, or indeed on any grounds.
To analyze and discuss the errors made by the court in the efforts to
distinguish each case individually would not be particularly helpful,
19 164 Wash. 685, 4 P2d 498 (1931).
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and in most cases the error is patent to the knowledgeable reader. Of
greater interest is the rationale presented to sustain the holding of the
inadequacy of the remedy by appeal.
The court begins with a recognition of the evil flowing from permitting review other than by the regular procedure, and then, as if
aware that it is about to contribute to the perpetuation of that evil.
the holding is specifically limited to writs of certiorari.
While not so drastic in character as prohibition or mandamus, still
certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, and its issuance, while discretionary to a considerable extent (more so perhaps than either prohibition or mandamus), must be guarded from abuse, otherwise the
regular procedure of review by appeal will be encroached upon to the
confusion of the practice and practitioners and to the overwhelming of
this court....
As we have already observed, prohibition and mandamus are in
their nature much more drastic than is certiorari, and for that reason
they are that much less discretionary writs. While heretofore we seem
to have failed to discriminate, yet we now feel that a discrimination
should be made, and nothing which follows should be taken to be
authority for the issuance of either the writ of prohibition or the writ
of mandamus.
By this writ, we are not asked to imperatively stay the hand of the
superior court, or, just as imperatively, to compel that court to do an
act which it has refused to perform; but only to review the record and
20
correct the errors which the statute provides may be so corrected.
The validity of making such a distinction between the writs is open
to serious question. It may be concluded from the above quotation
that the adequacy of the remedy at law to protect the fruits of the litigation depends not only upon the fact of the particular case but also
upon the nature of the writ sought. It is not easy to sustain such a

position. But even assuming that adequacy of the remedy by appeal
may vary with the writ which is sought, it would seem more reason-

able to take the view converse to that of the Wilson case. The opinion
seizes upon the fact that certiorari is more discretionary than the other
writs, and concludes therefrom that certiorari will lie in cases where

other writs may not lie. This reasoning is fallacious. Relief is afforded
a litigant either in the discretion of the court (as in certiorari), or
as a matter of right (as in the other writs perhaps or on appeal). In
the latter instance the court has no choice but to hear the matter if
the party complies with the procedural prerequisites, while in the
20

Id. at 687-89, 4 P.2d at 499-500.
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former the court may in the exercise of its discretition deem it inadvisable to grant the writ." Therefore, the discretion referred to is
the discretion to deny the writ where otherwise it would be incumbent
upon the court to grant it.
All of this, however, is collateral to the subject of delay and expense
in the ordinary course of litigation as factors in the granting of extraordinary relief. Here again the Wilson case pays lip service to the
sound policy against piecemeal appeals while in the course of violating
that very policy.
Much of what has heretofore been said on this subject has arisen
from a desire to avoid reviewing cases piecemeal, and that must still
be the rule. On appeal from a final judgment, we can usually review
the whole record and lay down the law of the case. When that can be
done, all questions arising in the case should, so far as possible, be reserved until, by one hearing and one decision, we can dispose of the
whole case. But here, if relator's complaint be well-founded, we have
a judgment which is voidable because based upon no facts found to
be the facts of the case by any trier of facts who heard the testimony.
On appeal from the final judgment, we could but reverse and vacate
that judgment, and could in no way review trial errors, settle the law
of the case or pass upon any of the merits of the controversy. The delay, the additional expense and the additional burden upon this court
caused by postponing the decision of the present questions until the
case is brought here upon appeal from the final judgment, would be
wholly useless.
Moreover, the relator, during the pendency of an appeal, would
have to suffer the burden of the lien on his real property cast by the
judgment and the injury to his credit arising from the same source.
The delay caused by following the regular course of review by
appeal, in and of itself, would be no reason to grant the extraordinary
writ; but such delay, when added to other reasons, may have considerable weight. Here, assuming relator's position to be correct, we
would, after an appeal, be obliged to hold that there had been a mistrial, and that the case must be tried de novo. In the interim, witnesses might have died or scattered and a miscarriage of justice might
result. It is always the policy of the law to award a speedy trial on the
merits, and anything
which unnecessarily delays such a trial is not to
22
be encouraged.

It is immediately apparent that the court has fallen into the same
error as the Martin case of operating on the questionable premise that
the trial court is in error. As has previously been observed, any inter21See 4 BANCROFT,
787 (1901).
22

CODE PRACTICE AND R EE--s

164 Wash. 685, 689-90, 4 P.2d 498, 500.

§ 2792 (1928) ; Annot., 50 L.R.A.
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locutory review is thus defensible if one first assumes the error of the
trial court. All that has been said on this subject in the discussion of
the Martin case is equally applicable here.
It would be difficult to underestimate the number of judicial manhours wasted in disposing of applications for writs of certiorari brought
by counsel legitimately relying upon the Wilson case. To construct
a factual situation less demanding of extraordinary relief would be no
mean task. Note that the findings and conclusions had been entered,
and the final judgment signed. Nothing further remained to be done
at the trial level. The case was ripe for appeal. The only delay would
be that suffered by any litigant in the ordinary course of appeal. The
opinion makes much of the injury to the credit of the relator from the
judgment against him. But, is this not an annoyance endured by many
appellants?
There is no good reason why the bar and judiciary must live with
the Wilson case. In the interests of the orderly and efficient administration of justice, and to remove a source of confusion to the practitioner, it should be specifically overruled at the earliest opportunity.
Review of Proceedings in Prior Trial. The problem of adequacy
of the remedy at law to review proceedings at a prior trial has arisen
in two ways. One is the situation presented when the court in which
the suit is instituted grants a change of venue to the superior court
of another county. The question is whether upon appeal from the
judgment at the conclusion of the trial in the second county the
supreme court may review the order in the first county granting the
change of venue.
The other situation arises when the trial court orders a mistrial,
grants a voluntary nonsuit, etc., and the action is retried. In certain
circumstances it may be relevant to have appellate review of a ruling
in the prior proceedings. The question is whether the prior proceedings
may be reviewed upon appeal of the retrial.
The first problem is exemplified by State ex rel. Scougale v. Superior
Court" where the superior court in county A ordered a change of
venue to county B. Mandamus was sought to compel the court in
county A to proceed with the trial. It was held that the remedy by
appeal was inadequate for, even assuming that the court in county B
would take jurisdiction, on appeal from that court the supreme court
could not direct the court in county A to proceed with the trial. The
2

55 Wash. 328, 104 Pac. 607 (1909).
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court cited State ex rel. Wyman, Partridge& Co. v. Superior Court24
to sustain its position.
In the Wyman case it was held that the writ would not lie because
the trial court acted within its jurisdiction in granting a change of
venue for the convenience of witnesses in a garnishment proceeding.
Therefore, the following quotation from the case on the subject of
adequacy of the remedy is dictum.
At the threshold of the proceeding the respondent raises the objection that the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, and that mandamus will not lie. If the contention of the relator is correct, viz., that
the superior court of Spokane county had exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine the garnishment proceedings without power or
discretion to order a change of venue, mandamus is the proper remedy. The mere fact that the superior court of Kittitas county, to which
the proceedings have been transferred, may erroneously assume jurisdiction and that the proceedings may in that way eventually reach this
court by appeal, is not, in our opinion, an adequate remedy.25
This dictum is open to a number of differing interpretations. Happily,
the court had immediate occasion in another case" to explain that
language.
In State ex rel. Wyman etc. Co. v. Superior Court... just decided,
this court entertained jurisdiction of an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the court to proceed with a garnishment proceeding
in which it had granted a change of venue. But in that case we could
not presume that the court to which the proceeding was transferred
would take jurisdiction, if in fact it had none, and furthermore, the
error there complained of could never be corrected by an appeal from
the court in which the error was committed.
We therefore held that
27
there was no adequate remedy by appeal.

On the basis of these cases it would have appeared settled that the
granting of a change of venue could be reviewed by extraordinary
writ because on appeal from the judgment in county B the supreme
court would be unable to review the granting of a change of venue by
county A. However, without recognition of these prior cases it was
2 that
held on similar facts in State ex rel. Furth v. Superior Court,
the remedy at law was adequate because on appeal the whole record
Wash. 443, 82 Pac. 875 (1905).
at 445, 82 Pac. at 875.
23
State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 877 (1905).
2
Id. at 558, 82 Pac. at 878.
2871 Wash. 147, 127 Pac. 1107 (1912).
2440
25

1d.
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could be reviewed no matter in what county or how many counties
the proceedings occurred."0
It cannot be said that any of these cases is "wrong." If the granting of the change of venue by county A can be reviewed on appeal of
the judgment of county B, then the remedy at law is adequate; otherwise not. Each of these holdings correctly follows from the premise
adopted. But which premise is correct? The answer to this question
involves no great policy considerations. Perhaps, in such a situation
as this the scope of review is nothing more nor less than what the
supreme court says it is. The present rule is anybody's guess. On the
one hand, it may be argued that more cases have held that the ruling
by county A may not be reviewed on appeal of the judgment of county
B; while on the other hand it may be contended that the more recent
case to the contrary overrules sub silentio the prior conflicting holdings.
Under the second fact pattern described at the beginning of this
section the cases have reached the conclusion that the remedy at law
was inadequate because the record at the former trial could not be
brought up on appeal of the second trial. In State ex rel. Stone v.
Superior Court"° the action originally had been brought against two
defendants for conspiracy to slander. At the end of the plaintiff's
case, defendant B successfully challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against her. The trial then continued against defendant M, and
during this subsequent period certain misconduct of a juror occurred.
The trial judge ordered a mistrial, but refused to enter a judgment of
dismissal in favor of defendant B because he was of the opinion that
the mistrial necessitated a retrial against both defendants. Held, that
the remedy by appeal was inadequate because upon retrial the evidence against defendant B might be sufficient, and on appeal she could
not bring up the record of the former trial.
To the same effect is State ex rel. Western Stevedore Co. v. Jones"
involving the granting of a voluntary nonsuit after the erroneous denial of defendant's motion for dismissal on the merits.
The rationale of these decisions holding the remedy at law inadequate is sound if the prior proceedings are in fact not reviewable upon
appeal of the second trial. It must be noted however that some instances may arise in which such prior proceedings are material to the
issues in the subsequent trial, e.g., to support a defense of res judicata.
29

See also State ex rel. Moore v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 362, 126 Pac. 926 (1912).

30 97 Wash. 172, 166 Pac. 69 (1917).

31 145 Wash. 258, 259 Pac. 718 (1927).
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In such case counsel is bound to offer the prior proceedings into evidence, and whether or not the trial court admits them, they become a
part of the record of the subsequent trial, and may be reviewed on
appeal. In such a situation it would be erroneous to permit review by
extraordinary writ.
Contempt Proceedings Pending Appeal. The question here considered is the propriety of a writ of prohibition to restrain a superior
court from enforcing a contempt order during the pendency of the
appeal of the final judgment in the contempt proceedings.
In State ex rel. Peterson v. Superior Court32 the trial court entered
a show cause order in a contempt proceeding against a witness who
resided outside the county and declined to attend the trial. The supreme court permitted the writ of prohibition to issue on the ground
that the show cause order was not appealable because interlocutory,
and that although adequacy of the remedy by appeal is not affected
by delay and expense, an appeal from the final judgment of contempt
would not be adequate because fine and imprisonment might be imposed by the trial court.
The error in the Peterson case was quickly brought to light in State
ex rel. Board of Comm'rs. v. Superior Court33 where it was held that
appeal from a final judgment of contempt was an adequate remedy
because relator had a right to a stay of execution pending appeal. The
Peterson case should have thereupon been overruled. Unfortunately,
the court sought to distinguish Peterson on the ground that in that
case an interlocutory show cause order was reviewed by prohibition
while in the instant case a final judgment of contempt had already
been entered. The fallacy in this distinction becomes apparent when
it is noted that review of the interlocutory order by appeal was
deemed inadequate in Peterson only because of the claimed inadequacy of an appeal to review the final judgment.
Still further confusion was injected by State ex rel. Mangaoang v.
Superior Court" where the defendants had appealed from an order
holding them in contempt for refusal to produce certain documents.
After the filing of the notice of appeal the superior court threatened
to hold defendants in contempt again for refusal to produce the documents. It was held that the trial court lost jurisdiction upon the filing
of the notice of appeal, and that appeal from the subsequent order
32 67
33 73
34 30

Wash. 370, 121 Pac. 836 (1912).
Wash. 296, 131 Pac. 816 (1913).
IVn.2d 692, 193 P.2d 318 (1948).
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of contempt was inadequate. The opinion does not indicate why the
remedy by appeal was inadequate, but it may be surmised that otherwise there would be an infinite number of contempt orders and appeals.
Some of the difficulty in this area may be the result of failure to
discriminate between an extraordinary writ directed to a superior court
and a stay of proceedings pending appeal. The supreme court has inherent power to grant a stay of proceedings pending appeal in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction to preserve the status quo or to preserve the
fruits of the litigation." Exercise of that power would have done complete justice in the above cases. The supreme court should not circumscribe this inherent power with limitations imposed upon exercise
of its original jurisdiction by extraordinary writ. The effect of operating under this self-imposed limitation is the unwarranted distortion
of the rules pertaining to the extraordinary writs in order to do justice
in a particular case where a stay of proceedings would have accomplished the desired end.
Vacation of Judgment. The general rule is that, if an order vacating a judgment is or may be followed by further proceedings in the
cause and the entry of a final judgment therein, such order is not itself
appealable, but may be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment. "
However, in State ex rel. Pacific Loan & Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Superior
Court" prohibition was granted to prevent the signing of an order vacating a judgment entered more than a year before. The remedy by
appeal was held to be inadequate because upon appeal of the subsequent trial the validity of the vacation order could not be raised.
The opposite conclusion was reached under essentially the same fact
pattern in State ex rel. Prentice v. Superior Court." The Pacific Loan
Co. case was distinguished on the ground that review there had been
invoked by writ of certiorari which had been requested as an alternative. The distinction fails for two reasons. First, although it is true
that in the Pacific Loan Co. case a writ of certiorari was requested as
an alternative, it is manifest from the discussion and holding that the
court granted a writ of prohibition. Second, even if it were so, there
is no reason why the court in the Prentice case could not have treated
35 Shamley v. City of Olympia, 47 Wn.2d 124, 286 P.2d 702 (1955) ; Northwest Improvement Co. v. McNeil, 98 Wash. 1, 167 Pac. 115 (1917). Yet, in two very early
cases prohibition was utilized for this purpose. State v. Superior Court, 6 Wash. 112,
32 Pac. 1072 (1893) ; State ex rel. Schloss v. Superior Court, 3 Wash. 696, 29 Pac.
202 (1892).
36 Bishop v. Illman, 9 Wn.2d 360, 115 P.2d 151 (1941), and cases cited therein.
37 84 Wash. 392, 146 Pac. 834 (1915).
3s 86 Wash. 90, 149 Pac. 321 (1915).
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the writ of prohibition as certiorari and have granted substantial relief.
Relief by writ of certiorari was granted in State ex rel. Plumb v.
Superior Court"9 to invalidate a vacation of judgment and sentence in
a criminal case, but the opinion does not discuss why the remedy by
appeal was considered inadequate.
The conclusion to be drawn from the cases analyzed above is that
certiorari is available to review an order vacating a judgment. It is
difficult to justify this rule in light of the holdings that such an order
may be reviewed upon appeal after the retrial. The fact that it is not
immediately reviewable is not a valid justification for utilization of an
extraordinary writ so long as the court adheres to the position that
adequacy of the remedy is not affected by delay and expense incurred
in the ordinary course of litigation.
Public Affairs and Public Officers. Our state supreme court has
been particularly responsive in providing speedy determination of
questions of public importance or public concern. Thus, judicial review by extraordinary writ has been permitted based upon recognition of a serious power shortage in the Pacific Northwest,"' and upon
recognition of local crime conditions.4 Also, in State ex re. Mills v.
Superior Court" the supreme court granted a writ of prohibition to
restrain a superior court from considering certain irregularities in a
primary election. The opinion does not state why the remedy at law
is inadequate, but it may be surmised that the matter would have become moot unless determined prior to the general election."3
The status of litigation involving public officers in their official capacities is not so clear. An early case' applies to public officers in
their official acts the same rules that apply to other litigants. However, a different view was adopted in State ex rel. Skaggs v. Smith.
In that case the director of a state penal institution declined to accept
a convicted offender because the legislature had made no appropriation for the institution for the current biennium, and as a consequence
it was necessary to close the institution to the reception of inmates to
31
40 24 Wn2d 510, 166 P.2d 188 (1946).
State ex rel. P.U.D. Dist. No. 1 v. Schwab, 40 Wn.2d 814, 246 P.2d 1081 (1952)
(construction of the Box Canyon Dam).
41 State ex rel. Hodde v. Superior Court, 40 Wn.2d 502, 244 P.2d 668 (1952) (removal of injunction against legislative investigating committee).
42 149 Wash. 473, 271 Pac. 333 (1928).
"But cf. State ex re. Bprbo v. Hadley, 20 Wash. 520, 56 Pac. 29 (1899), where it
4
was held that the delay incident to appeal did not make the remedy inadequate even
though it was desirable and of importance to Whatcom County to obtain a construction
of the law in question prior to the adjournment of the legislature.
44 State ex tel. Reed v. Jones, 2 Wash. 662, 27 Pac. 452 (1891).
45116 Wash. 572, 200 Pac. 92 (1921).
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avoid spending more money than was available. A superior court issued an order to show cause why the director should not be held in
contempt. Relator then applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain
the proceedings in the superior court. The supreme court disposed
of the contention that there was an adequate remedy by appeal, as
follows:
The relator is a state officer. His duties are arduous and cover a
wide field in state affairs. The charge against him here is in its effect
malfeasance of official duty, and a defense to the charge will necessarily
take him from the discharge of his official duties for a considerable
period of time. Plainly, before the state should be thus deprived of his
services, it ought to be clear
that the court proceeding against him has
46
jurisdiction to so proceed.

The same question was raised in State ex rel. Ernst v. Superior
Court17 in which a superior court was proceeding to review certain

administrative functions of the social security department. The court
reverted to the earlier rule, and attempted to distinguish the Skaggs
case with the following language:
It cannot be conceded that the questions presented by the pleadings
will absorb the attention of the trial court or compel the attendance of
relators for any considerable extended period of time. To hold that
state officers, as such, are to be allowed exemptions from the rule applied to other 48litigants, would not be in keeping with the provisions
of the statute.

It is difficult to defend the distinction presented by the Ernst case.
The issues involved in Skaggs were of a purely legal nature. The physical presence of the director of the institution at the hearing would not
have been required except perhaps briefly for testimony. Counsel for
the department of institutions could have relieved the director of most
of the burdens imposed by defense of that lawsuit. If indeed state
officers are to be allowed no special exemptions from the rules of court,
the result of the failure to overrule the Skaggs case is to mislead counsel for state officers into seeking review by extraordinary writ, and
thereby needlessly adding to the litigation presented to the supreme
court.
Bail and Trial by Jury. The conflict in the case law that has
developed in other areas is also manifest in the criminal area. 9
Id. at 579, 200 Pac. at 94.
47 198 Wash. 133, 87 P.2d 294 (1939).
48 Id. at 138-39, 87 P.2d at 296.
49
See Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1262 (1942).
46
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In State ex rel. Belt v. Kennan0 the supreme court sustained the
granting of a writ of prohibition to prevent a police court from proceeding in a criminal action in which the police judge refused to call
a jury. It was stated that the remedy by appeal "may be doubtful." 1
Yet, in State ex rel. Potter v. Superior Court" the court invalidated a
writ of prohibition directed against a justice of the peace who allegedly intended to select a jury panel in an unconstitutional or erroneous
manner. It was held that the remedy by trial de novo in the superior
court would be adequate. No mention was made of the Belt case.
The development of the case law on the question of bail has been
similar. In an early case, State ex rel. Jones v. Gay," it was held that
the remedy by appeal would be inadequate where the relator was
charged with a felony, and financially unable to furnish bail or prosecute an appeal. A contrary view was adopted in State ex rel. Stevens
v. Paul:"
Relator urges that he has no adequate remedy by appeal because,
being insane, he is not permitted to be at liberty on bail pending such
appeal, and that this distinguishes our previous decisions. But we think
this is a distinction that is apparent rather than real. One charged with
murder in the first degree, where the statute does not permit the giving
of bail, one charged with a lesser offense and unable to give bail,
and one charged with insanity whose condition makes it dangerous
for him to be at large, and who is therefore not permitted to furnish
bail, all have an adequate remedy by appeal, and it has never been held
that delay, expense or incarceration prevented appeal from being an
adequate remedy. 55
Here also the court apparently was unaware of a prior holding in conflict with its position. (On the question of adequacy of the remedy at
law the Stevens opinion distinguishes State ex rel. Garber v. Savidge"
on the ground that the latter involved the constitutionality of a statute of public importance while the instant case merely involved important private rights. This statement is a tantalizing invitation to
discuss the relative importance of private rights and public rights
under the American system of jurisprudence. Regrettably, the subject
is far beyond the scope of this article.)
5025 Wash. 621, 66 Pac. 62 (1901).
51 The court relied upon Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) to support the holding. The question of the propriety of a writ was not involved in that case.
52135 Wash. 344, 237 Pac. 717 (1925).
53 65 Wash. 629, 118 Pac. 830 (1911).
54 134 Wash. 415, 235 Pac. 960 (1925) ; see also State ex rel. Sibbald v. Huntington,
1 Wn.2d 413, 96 P2d 446 (1939).
55134 Wash. 415, 416-17, 235 Pac. 960, 961 (1925).
56 132 Wash. 631, 233 Pac. 946 (1925).
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In both of these areas the sounder view is the one stated in the
later case. If the earlier cases were to be followed, the remedy by
appeal in criminal cases would shortly fall into disuse, and the orderly administration of justice be impeded. Hence, it should be argued that the earlier cases have been overruled sub silentio, and it is
to be hoped that the supreme court will take that position at its earliest opportunity.
Mandamus To Compel the Assertion of Jurisdiction. Cases dealing with mandamus to compel the assertion of jurisdiction by an inferior court are also discussed in other sections in so far as they bear
on the propositions there under examination. They are grouped together here because they stand in a singular position as regards the
adequacy of the remedy by appeal. It is readily apparent that in this
class of cases the delay and expense incurred prior to appeal is minimal. The refusal of the trial court to hear the cause terminates the
proceedings for all practical purposes, and appeal is immediately available." Therefore, as a matter of reason it would seem that the remedy
at law is quite adequate, and a writ of mandamus should not be available. However, the courts of this and other jurisdictions have unnecessarily complicated the matter by resort to narrow legalistic reasoning. The Washington cases will be examined rather briefly for many
of them are included in a series of early annotations which adequately
describe the development of the law on this point." Suffice it to say
that in this state there have developed more or less independently
two lines of cases taking opposing positions on whether the remedy
by appeal is adequate to review the refusal by a trial court to assert
jurisdiction.
The leading case in support of the view that the remedy by appeal
is adequate is State ex rel. Light Co. v. Superior Court.5" There the
defendant had refused to obey the judgment of the trial court, but
had given no bond for security or to stay proceedings pending appeal.
The trial court declined to entertain a contempt proceeding, believing
that it had lost jurisdiction upon the filing of the notice of appeal.
57 Cases involving the granting of a change of venue, and others where further proceedings are contemplated, are not considered here for the obvious reason that the
action at the trial level has not been exhausted by the refusal to assert jurisdiction.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Stone v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 172, 166 Pac. 69 (1917) ;
State ex ret. Furth v. Superior Court, 71 Wash. 147, 127 Pac. 1107 (1912) ; State ex
rel. Scougale v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 328, 104 Pac. 607 (1909) ; State ex rel.
Wyman, Partridge & Co. v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 443, 82 Pac. 875 (1905).
58 Anno:, 4 N I.R. 582, 610, 632, 655 (1919).
59 20 Waih. 502. 55 Pac. 933 (1899).
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The opinion of the supreme court directed itself to writ practice in
general, not merely to mandamus. Prior cases to the contrary -were
not discussed other than by the general recognition that the practice
had developed of issuing writs without regard to the adequacy of the
remedy at law. The opinion then announced that such practice was
no longer to be tolerated because appealed cases are as a rule more
carefully prepared by the attorneys and more carefully considered by
the court.
The rule in the Light Co. case was adhered to in several subsequent
mandamus cases.6"
Also of note is State ex rel. Piper v. Superior.Court,61 in which the
trial court declined to take jurisdiction of an annulment proceeding
because service had been by publication instead of by personal service. The court reasoned as follows:
Neither the application of the relator nor the transcript which accompanies the application shows that the court was asked to, or refused
to, enter a judgment of dismissal of the action. If such judgment of
dismissal had been made, an appeal would have lain from such judgment to this court, and such appeal would have been an adequate remedy. The petition and the accompanying record failing to show that
the court refused to do any act the omission of which would deprive
the relator of her6 2 right to appeal, the writ cannot be allowed, and is
therefore denied.
It must be recognized that the portion of the above statement regarding adequacy of the remedy by appeal is dictum. The narrow
holding is that such a case is not ripe for any review at all until the
trial court has been requested to, and has acted upon a motion to
dismiss."'
Leading the line of cases holding that mandamus is the proper form
of review is the early decision of State ex rel. Shannon v. Hunter."
There the superior court declined to take jurisdiction under the erroneous belief that it should not hear cases where the sum sued for was
60 State ex rel. Hubbard v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 438, 64 Pac. 727 (1901) ; State
ex rel. Improvement Co. v. Moore, 21 Wash. 629, 59 Pac. 505 (1899); State ex rel.
McIntyre v. Superior Court, 21 Wash. 108, 57 Pac. 352 (1899) ; State ex rel. Barbo v.'
Hadley, 20 Wash. 520, 56 Pac. 29 (1899). Cf. State ex rel. Dailey v. Superior Court,
150 Wash. 299, 272 Pac. 733 (1928) ; State ex rel. Godfrey v. Superior Court, 111
Wash. 101, 189 Pac. 256 (1920).
6145 Wash. 196, 87 Pac. 1120 (1906).
62 Id. at 197, 87 Pac. at 1120.
63 Of course, if the trial court is requested, but refuses, to act at all on the matter,
mandamus lies to compel the court to make some disposition so that the appellate
court would have something to review by appeal. State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior
Court, 73 Wash. 507, 131 Pac. 1136 (1913).
643 Wash. 92, 27 Pac. 1076 (1891).
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less than $100. The supreme court demonstrated a clear understanding of the question, and issued a definitive opinion:
The superior court, then, erroneously dismissed the case, and the
remaining question above suggested is as to the proper remedy. The
position taken by the respondent is that such judgment of dismissal
is a final judgment, and determines the cause as fully as would a
judgment on the merits; that in rendering the same the court acts
judicially, and its discretion in so doing cannot be controlled by mandamus. There is much force in this position, and, if the question were
a new one, unaffected by authority, we might come to the conclusion
that the proper remedy in such a case was by appeal, and not by
mandamus; but the authorities seem to have established the other
doctrine, and to have decided that from judgments of dismissal for
want of jurisdiction no appeal will lie, but that the only remedy is by
mandamus. [discussing U.S. cases]65

The court also alluded to the opinion of a judge in a Nevada case:
He says that the discretion of the lower court is not controlled by
such writ; that the question as to whether or not such court has jurisdiction in the particular matter is a preliminary one; and that the appellate court, in granting the writ, decides that question for the lower
court, and does not compel it to decide it at all; and at great length
elaborates and ably maintains the position contended for by the petitioner in this proceeding. In view of these authorities, we feel bound
to hold that the proper remedy, where a cause has been erroneously
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, is mandamnus.6 6
The same rule was adopted in some later cases without citation to
case authority."
The conflicting lines of cases converged in State ex rel. Martin v.
6 8 in which mandamus was sought to compel the trial
Superior Court,
court to assume jurisdiction on a petition concerning an insane person.
It was held that the writ would lie because a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction is not a "judicial or discretionary act" properly to be reviewed by appeal. A half-hearted effort was made to distinguish the
Light Co. case and to explain the Piper case. The shortcomings of
these efforts are explored at greater length in another context in the
next section.
65 Id. at 94-95, 27 Pac. at 1077.
66 Id. at 96, 27 Pac. at 1077.
67 State ex rel. Strohl v. Superior Court, 20 Wash. 545, 56 Pac. 35 (1899) ; State
ex rel. Smith v. McClinton, 17 Wash. 45, 48 Pac. 740 (1897) ; State ex reL. Smith v.
Parker, 12 Wash. 685, 42 Pac. 113 (1895) ; State ex rel. Maltby v. Superior Court,
7 Wash. 223, 34 Pac. 922 (1893) ; State ex rel. Romano v. Yakey, 43 Wash. 15, 85
Pac. 990 (1906) (dictum).
68 101 Wash. 81. 172 Pac. 257 (191).
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Martin has been followed by the more recent cases,"9 and consequently is probably the better practice before the supreme court. So
long as the practitioner is apprised of the form of review to follow, it
makes little difference which is finally adopted by the court. The
strongest argument against extended writ practice-elimination of multiple, piecemeal appeals-has no application to the instant situation
where the matter has been concluded in the trial court and is ripe for
appellate review in one way or another. Moreover, the delays and
expenses involved in reviewing such a dismissal either by appeal or
by writ of mandamus are about equal. Under present supreme court
practice the writ of mandamus could perhaps be heard somewhat
sooner because writs may be set for hearing on a motion day on
rather short notice, while appeals must be ready well in advance of
the term in order to be docketed.
MUST THE REMEDY AT LAW BE INADEQUATE?

The statutes unequivocally state that the writs will not lie unless the
court is acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction and the remedy
at law is inadequate. Nothing could be more clear. Yet, in order to
reach the merits in certain cases our supreme court has indulged itself
in games of semantics and judicial gymnastics to carve out exceptions
to this rule. The resulting body of case law is incomprehensible and
a source of wonder to the practitioner. It is not the purpose of this
article to attempt to rationalize the irrational, but rather to be of some
aid to the lawyer who would otherwise find himself in the maze of
conflicting and unintelligible rules. To that end the historical or chronological treatment of the cases is the most profitable approach.
In the first case of note, State ex rel. Reed v. Jones,70 a very narrow
and relatively innocuous exception to the general rule was recognized:
And in Ex parte Roundtree, . . the court says:

"If the court is one of established jurisdiction, a plea that the subjectmatter of a particular suit lies without its jurisdiction, or that the party
is not amenable to its cognizance, will ordinarily afford full relief. But
when the question involves the legal existence and construction of a
court-a denial of all jurisdiction, and not of the particular jurisdiction proposed to be exercised,-a prohibition, it seems to us, is the
only adequate remedy."
This, it appears to us, is a clear and explicit statement of the law, and
69 State ex rel. Pryor v. Paul, 5 Wn.2d 90, 104 P.2d 745 (1940); State ex rel.
Pacific Coast Adjustment Co. v. Taggart, 159 Wash. 201, 292 Pac. 741 (1930) ; State
ex rel. S. & R.V.Ry. v. Superior Court, 123 Wash. 116, 212 Pac. 259 (1923).
70 2 Wash. 662, 27 Pac. 452 (1891).
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the language is peculiarly applicable to the case at bar. We are all of
the opinion that the relators have a complete remedy by appeal from
any final judgment that may be rendered by the superior court, and
that there is therefore no necessity for resorting to the extraordinary
remedy by prohibition. [citing cases from other jurisdictions] 1
No case has been found in which it was sought to invoke a writ in
order to challenge the legal existence or construction of our courts.
Nevertheless, the judicial practice soon developed of considering writs
without questioning whether the remedy at law was adequate," until
in State ex rel. Light Co. v. Superior Court 3 the court decided to return to the original practice. Great reliance was placed upon the Reed
case, and the following significant statements were made:
Since that time, however, many cases have been decided where the
writ of prohibition issued where the court was proceeding to act without jurisdiction, and a writ of mandamus has issued where the court
refused to take jurisdiction which rightfully belonged to it, without
regard to whether an adequate remedy existed by appeal or otherwise.
We have become satisfied, however, that this practice is not in consonance with the best authority, and is not conducive to a careful and
close investigation of causes by this court.... We think that the better
authority, as well as the better practice, precludes the issuance of these
writs when the law furnishes an adequate remedy .... 74
We feel at liberty to establish a rule at variance with some of the
decisions of this court, for the reason that this is simply a law of procedure and practice, and no vested rights can have grown up under
the former decisions of the court, and no hardship will follow in this
case from the change of the rule, for the reason that a majority of the
court is opposed to the issuance of the writ on the merits. But, in
addition, it plainly appearing that there is an adequate remedy by appeal, we take this opportunity of announcing the law of this state to be
that extraordinary writs of this character will
not be allowed to issue
75
when there is an adequate remedy at law.

That should have been sufficient to put the matter at rest. The
members of the bar apparently were not so easily convinced for within the year the court felt it necessary to call attention to the Light Co.
case stating:
71 Id. at 666, 27 Pac. at 453.
72 State ex rel. Alladio v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 54, 48 Pac. 733 (1897) ; State
x reLt.Stockman v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 366, 46 Pac. 395 (1896) ; State ex rel.
Rucker v. Stallcup, 11 Wash. 713, 40 Pac. 341 (1895) ; State ex rel. Allen v. Superior
Court, 9 Wash. 668, 38 Pac. 206 (1894) ; State ex rel. Campbell v. Superior Court,
7 Wash. 306, 34 Pac. 1103 (1893) ; State ex rel. Cummings v. Superior Court, 5
Wash. 518, 32 Pac. 457 (1893) ; City of North Yakima v. Superior Court, 4 Wash.
655, 30 Pac. 1053 (1892).
7320 Wash. 502, 55 Pac. 933 (1899).
74 Id. at 504-05, 55 Pac. at 933-34.
75 Id. at 508, 55 Pac. at 935.
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[W]e sought to point out the distinction between the cases where the
writ was properly and where it was improperly issued, and attempted
to get back to the correct procedure. If we may judge from the fact
that applications for these writs are still being made to this court in
cases falling squarely within that case, the principle sought to be announced therein cannot have7 6been generally understood, and it may be
well to restate the rule here.

The rule was once again stated to be that prohibition will lie without
regard to adequacy of the remedy by appeal only where there is a
denial of jurisdiction involving the legal existence of a court; and not
where the question is the jurisdiction over the particular parties or
subject matter.7

An attempt to deal a final death blow to improper writ practice
before the supreme court was made in State ex rel. Miller v. Superior
Court." Prohibition was there requested to restrain further proceedings after the denial of a motion for a change of venue to defendant's
county of residence. The court held, that even though the filing of
such a motion ousts the superior court of jurisdiction, the writ will
not lie because there is an adequate remedy by appeal."9 The opinion
cites many, many cases, and relies particularly upon the Light Co.
case. It was stated that the Light Co. case in effect overruled certain
named prior cases, 8" which cases were thereupon expressly overruled.
The seed of future deviation from the established rule was sown by
what must have been the inadvertent failure to expressly overrule
1
The holding in the Alladio
State ex rel. Alladio v. Superior Court."

case, that the only question that need be considered is that of lack of
jurisdiction,

2

is dearly contrary to the Light Co. and Miller cases.

76 State ex rel. Vincent v. Benson, 21 Wash. 571, 573, 58 Pac. 1066 (1899).
7z This rule was followed in: State ex reL. Investment Co. v. Superior Court, 31

Wash. 410, 71 Pac. 1100 (1903) ; State ex tel. Hubbard v. Superior Court, 24 Wash.
438, 64 Pac. 727 (1901) ; State ex tel. Improvement Co. v. Moore, 21 Wash. 629, 59
Pac. 505 (1899).
78 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 877 (1905).
791d.

at 559, 82 Pac. at 878: 'We again announce the rule that the adequacy of

the remedy by appeal, or in the ordinary course of law, is the test to be applied by
this court in all applications for extraordinary writs, and not the mere.question of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction."
80 State ex rel. Stockmen v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 366, 46 Pac. 395 (1896);
State ex rel. Allen v. Superior Court, 9 Wash. 668, 38 Pac. 206 (1894) ; State ex tel.
Campbell v. Superior Court, 7 Wash. 306,, 34 Pac. 1103 (1893) ; State ex rel. Cummings v. Superior Court, 5 Wash. 518, 32 Pac. 457 (1893).
8117 Wash. 54, 48 Pac. 733 (1897).
82Id. at 55, 48 Pac. at 733: "The next objection is that this court has no authority
to issue the writ in such a case as this, but we think this point has been settled by the
numerous decisions of this court contrary to the contentions of the respondent, and
that there is nothing in this case to call for any further discussion of the question,
and the only question to be considered is, was the notice sufficient to confer juris-

diction of the cause upon the superior court."
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It would have been a reasonable assumption that it had been overruled sub silentio but for the fact that it has been subsequently cited
to sustain further departure from the established rule.
In State ex rel. Wood v. Superior Court8" prohibition was sought to
restrain the court from proceeding in a will contest not brought within
one year. Held, that where the court is proceeding without first having
acquired jurisdiction, the remedy is by prohibition without regard
to the adequacy of the remedy by appeal. To support this holding the
court cited the Alladio case.84
The thread of error was extended in State ex rel. Hopinan v. Superior
Court,8" which cited the Wood case to sustain prohibition of proceedings instituted upon irregular service of process."
This erroneous line of cases met head on with the established rule in
a most marvelous appellate opinion, State ex rel. Martin v. Superior
Court. The factual situation was identical to that in the Miller case,
i.e., prohibition to restrain further proceedings after denial of a motion
for a change of venue to defendant's county of residence. It was held
that where a statute grants a right independent of the merits of the
cause, and the facts are undisputed with no element of discretion involved, the writ will lie. The court reached this result by (1) reliance
upon the Wood and Hopman cases, (2) by reliance upon certain
mandamus and certiorari cases, and (3) by an incomprehensible
circumvention of a directly contrary holding in the Miller case.
The invalidity of the Wood and Hopman cases has been discussed
above, and will not be reiterated here.
The Martin opinion cited several mandamus88 and certiorari89 cases
concerned with venue in which relief had been granted. The argument
then proceeded thusly:
If prohibition be the counterpart of mandamus, it should follow that
the one might be employed to compel, and the other to prohibit upon
the same state of facts, depending upon whether plaintiff or defendant,
8376 Wash. 27, 135 Pac. 494 (1913).
84 Also cited is State ex rel. Mackintosh v. Superior Court, 45 Wash. 248, 88 Pac.
207 (1907). The Mackintosh case lends no support whatever. It merely held that
prohibition would not lie to prevent action within the inherent power of the court.
8588 Wash. 612, 153 Pac. 315 (1915).
86 The court also cited State ex rel. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Superior Court, 87
Wash. 498, 151 Pac. 1094 (1915), which has no discussion at all on the propriety of
the writ.
8797

Wash. 358, 166 Pac. 630 (1917).

State ex rel. Nash v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 614, 144 Pac. 898 (1914) ; State
ex rel. Scougale v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 328, 104 Pac. 607 (1909) ; State ex rel.
Wyman, Partridge & Co. v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 443, 82 Pac. 875 (1905).
89 State ex rel. Griffith v. Superior Court, 96 Wash. 41, 164 Pac. 516 (1917) ; State
ex rel. Schwabacher v. Superior Court, 61 Wash. 681, 112 Pac. 927 (1911).
88
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invokes the writ. To say that mandamus will lie, if the court to which
a case is ordered sent does not have jurisdiction, and may refuse to
take jurisdiction or delay the case pending a trial, and to deny that
prohibition will lie to prevent a court without jurisdiction from trying
a case that ought to be sent to another county, is drawing the sights so
fine that the "judicial mind" has been put to some extremity to mark
the line of cleavage. 90
As a matter of abstract logic it would be a simple task indeed to
demonstrate that a rule applicable to a given situation is not necessarily
applicable to the converse situation. However, it is not necessary to
delve into the abstract; the cases have explained it in the specific.
All but one9' of the cases cited in the opinion are dependent upon
State ex rel. Wyman, Partridge& Co. v. Superior Court9 for their
validity. In that case by dictum it was stated that an appeal would
not be an adequate remedy to review the granting of a change of venue.
This is the converse of the Miller and Martin cases in which the court
had denied a change of venue. The significance of this difference was
clearly spelled out in the Miller case:
In State ex rel. Wyman etc. Co. v. Superior Court,..., just decided,
this court entertained jurisdiction of an application for a writ of
mandamus to compel the court to proceed with a garnishment proceeding in which it had granted a change of venue. But in that case
we could not presume that the court to which the proceeding was
transferred would take jurisdiction, if in fact it had none, and furthermore, the error there complained of could never be corrected by an
appeal from the court in which the error was committed. We therefore
held that there was no adequate remedy by appeal.9
To paraphrase, the remedy by appeal was deemed inadequate to
review the granting of the change of venue because (1) if the court to
which the cause was transferred also declined to accept jurisdiction,
the action would never be heard, and obviously could never be considered on appeal; and (2) even if the cause were accepted by the
second county, on appeal the supreme court could not review an error
committed in the first county.
Clearly, these reasons do not apply to the denial of a change of
venue. The court which enters the denial is the court which will hear
the cause, and the court from which the appeal will be taken. ThereWash. 358, 364, 166 Pac. 630, 632 (1917).
91 State ex rel. Griffith v. Superior Court, 96 Wash. 41, 164 Pac. 516 (1917) has
no discussion of the matter.
92 40 Wash. 443, 82 Pac. 875 (1905).
90 97

us 40 Wash. at 558, 82 Pac. at 878.
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fore, the remedy by appeal would be adequate to review the denial of
a change of venue, but not to review the granting of a change of venue.
It has already been noted that the Martin and Miller cases came to
the opposite result on identical facts. But by a most breathtaking
exercise of judicial legerdemain the Miller case is "distinguished."
Whether this court will anticipate and review errors of the trial
court upon such questions as inhere in the record which may be heard
on appeal, is one that has sorely perplexed the judicial mind and much
confusion has crept into our cases. But it would seem that the doctrine
of State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court ... is still unimpeached and

unimpaired. The real question is whether it was properly applied in
that case. The rule as stated does not deny that the writ will lie where
the remedy by appeal is inadequate. It is said, "The adequacy of the
remedy by appeal or in the ordinary course of law, is there declared
(State ex rel. Townsend Gas & Elec. L. Co. v. Superior Court ... ) to

be the true test in all cases, and not the mere question of jurisdiction or
lack of jurisdiction." Hence the inquiry whether the remedy by appeal
is adequate or whether that question, when coupled with a question of
jurisdiction is enough to sustain the writ, is not foreclosed.94
Now, how is that again? The Miller case held that the remedy by
appeal was adequate to review the denial of a change of venue. Why
that did not foreclose the identical question in the Martin case requires
more sophisticated reasoning than can be mustered by mere mortals.
Further, near the conclusion of the opinion in the Martin case it is
said: "The question why we do not overrule the Miller case may
occur." (A masterpiece of understatement.) It is then explained that
Miller was rightly decided because one of the three defendants did not
join in the motion for a change of venue, and on that ground it was
correctly denied. This is patently false. The Miller case was not decided on that ground. The rules of law and application of those rules
to the factual pattern in the Miller case are in direct contradiction to
the Martin case. The fortuitous circumstance that the result in a case
happens to be supportable on an entirely different ground does not
make that case "good law." It is the rule of law and its application
that are either affirmed or overruled, not the incidental outcome. It is
submitted that the Miller and Martin cases are directly in conflict,
and that one must be overruled. It is further submitted that only the
Miller case can be supported by reason and by the law.
Before leaving the Martin case one more observation is in order.
The following is stated as the rule being promulgated in the case:
4

97 Wash. at 359-60, 166 Pac. at 630-31.
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It would seem, if the statute grants a right that does not depend
upon the merit of the case, but is independent of the merit of the case,
that a litigant should not be put to the hazard, delay, and expense of
the trial upon the merits as a prerequisite to the assertion of the right.
In such cases, the court is called upon to deal with something more
than "simply a law of procedure and practice," as was held by Judge
Dunbar, and properly so, considering the record in the case of State
ex rel. Townsend Gas & El. L. Co. v. Superior Court... It is a right
made equivalent to the right to fix the venue of a local action under the
statute, and when asserted should not be thrust aside as an incident or
an error to be heard upon an appeal from a judgment on the merits.95
Near the beginning of this section we had occasion to quote the

paragraph in the Light Co. case in which is included the statement that
this is "simply a law of procedure and practice."

The point being

made in that paragraph was that the court had no qualms about
changing the rule because it was not the type of rule of law upon
which litigants and lawyers might rely to their detriment. Martin

seizes upon this phrase, quotes it out of context, and claims to find
support for a holding contrary to that of the Light Co. case.
One would have thought that the court had injected sufficient confusion to becloud the most reasoning mind. But, alas, there was still
more to come. The next judicial effort was an entirely unrelated Martin

case." This was a mandamus action to compel the superior court to
take jurisdiction on a petition concerning an insane person. It was
held (3-2) that the writ would lie. The majority opinion relied heavily

upon treatises, text-writers, and cases from other jurisdictions. Numerous local cases were discussed, the majority coming to the conclusion that authority could be found on either side. Among those
quoted in support of the majority view was the fallacious Wood case
which has already been discussed. The following comments on two

other key cases are noteworthy..
Coming now to our own decisions in State ex reL. Martin v. Superior
Court... we endeavored to show that, in most of the cases where a
writ had been denied, it was because of the holding that appeal was
an adequate remedy. And we think in all of them the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject-matter was not questioned. It may be said
that the genesis of all the subsequent confusion and conflict, or apparent
conflict, in our own decisions is in the case of State ex re. Townsend
Gas & Elec. L. Co. v. Superior Court.... We have had to resort to
the original briefs, and can say, in addition to what we said of it in the
Or Id..at 361-62, 166 Pac. at 631.
96 State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court, 101 Wash. 81, 172 Pac. 257 (1918).
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Martin case, that the question put by counsel to the court was not
whether a court would compel an inferior court to take jurisdiction of
a case where jurisdiction had been disclaimed, but whether the court
would compel the satisfaction of a judgment through the process of a
contempt proceeding pending an appeal upon the merits. The court
was exercising an acknowledged jurisdiction; it had passed on the
merits. Its judgment, if ill-founded, rested in error, and the writ was
properly denied. There is certainly nothing in the decision when read
with the record in mind that makes it an authority against our
holding.

97

At the outset it must be recognized that the holding of a court is not
necessarily limited by the briefs of the parties, and to so interpret a
case after "resort to the original briefs" is of dubious value. Moreover,
as our early quotation from the Light Co. case shows, the court was
well aware that the writ should be denied on the merits, but took the
opportunity to make the broad and sound statement that writs should
not issue unless the remedy by appeal were inadequate. So understood,
the Light Co. case is authority against this holding.
The quoted comment, that in the cases cited in the first Martin case
"jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter was not questioned,"
defies comprehension. Does this mean that the question of jurisdiction
was never raised or was admitted or was denied? And in any event,
so what? The meaning of the statement, if any, is lost.
But all of this is less important than the stated reasons for the
decision. Two main arguments are presented. First:
It is fundamental that a higher court will not control the judicial acts
of an inferior court. It will not invade the realm. Its prime function is
to review for error. The first consideration, then, must be to determine
the character of the act of the inferior court. Is a judgment of dismissal
based upon a denial of jurisdiction over a subject-matter a judicial act
in the sense that it is a judgment which ought to be reviewed on appeal?
A dismissal under the mistaken belief that the court has no jurisdiction is in no sense a judicial act for it rests upon a disclaimer of the
judicial function. The court has neither heard nor determined. Neither
the law nor the facts are affected in the slightest degree, and appeals
being for the correction of judicial errors, errors of discretion or of
the judicial mind, it follows that one entitled should have resort to some
method by which the court can be set in motion. The court has done
nothing which is either judicial or discretionary. It has refused to do
either. Its judgment is nullius filius, a void thing, binding no one, a
legal nonentity.9 8
9

Id. at 89, 172 Pac. at 259.

98 Id. at 85-86, 172 Pac. at 258.
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This seems to be a hypertechnical argument without support in reality. It is merely semantical to say that a court does not exercise a
judicial function in deciding that it has no jurisdiction. Such a determination is made upon study of the case and statute law as in other
judicial matters. It is difficult to see the difference in judicial function between a holding that the court lacks jurisdiction, and a holding, for example, that a statute upon which an action is premised, is
unconstitutional. Moreover, if the statement that appeals are for the
correction of judicial errors intends to imply that jurisdictional matters will not be then considered, it is, of course, incorrect. And finally,
the fact that the judgment is a "void thing" has no particular significance for all judgments entered without jurisdiction are void in that
sense. If that were a basis of distinction, the question of jurisdiction
would always be reviewable by writ without regard to the adequacy
of the remedy by appeal.
The second main argument is this:
We have not always differentiated between inherent power to hear
and power to proceed. This has resulted in a confusion in our decisions. With this distinction preserved, the law is clear. Where there
is a lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court itself, a writ of prohibition will lie to restrain it from further proceedings; or where the court
has erroneously decided that such inherent jurisdiction is lacking, mandamus will lie to compel it to entertain the cause and to hear and determine. Where, however, the question is whether the court, acting
within the scope of its admitted jurisdiction, has acquired jurisdiction
over the parties or the particular subject-matter, the writ will not issue.
In such a case, the court is exercising its judicial function in passing
on the question, not whether it has inherent jurisdiction, but whether
it has acquired jurisdiction or a right to proceed within the limit of
an admitted jurisdiction. If, in the exercise of its discretion or judgment, it commits error, the proper remedy is by appeal, and not by
writ of prohibition or mandamus. Viewed in this light, the decision in
the Pipercase... is entirely consistent, for there the court did not hold
that it lacked jurisdiction inherently, but simply that its jurisdiction
had not been properly invoked.99
According to the majority opinion the confusion disappears and the
law becomes clear when the meaning of "inherent jurisdiction" is understood. Aye, there's the rub! ! Apparently it means something other
than jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. But, what?
If "inherent jurisdiction" has any real meaning, it was incumbent
99 Id. at 92-93, 172 Pac. at 260.
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upon the majority to explain it with some clarity. Very likely it has
no such meaning and the view of the dissenting opinion is correct.
If the writ may issue in this case, then it may issue in all cases where

a general demurrer which goes to the jurisdiction, either of the person
or of the subject-matter, is sustained to a complaint. The issuance of
the writ in this case again opens the door to appeals by writs of mandamus and not in the ordinary way.... I agree that, prior to State ex
rel. Miller v. Superior Court... this court had issued writs of mandamus where there was a remedy by appeal. But, as stated in that
case, all those decisions were overruled where the question of jurisdiction of the court below was the sole test of jurisdiction in this court,
and the quotation from the Langley case, supra... shows that the rule
has been adhered to where there was a remedy by appeal. The general
rule in other states may be that errors of this kind may be reviewed
by a writ of mandamus, but that is not the rule in this court and we
have frequently so held, because the statute of this state controls, and
provides that such writs may be issued only where there is not a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy by appeal .... 1oo
I agree, of course, that the extraordinary writ of prohibition or mandamus may be a speedy and easy way of reviewing errors which occur
in the trial court, but until the majority opinion becomes the law and
reads out of the statute § 1015, as it undoubtedly does, and overrules
State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court, supra, and numerous other
cases holding to the same effect, I must withhold my concurrence in
that practice.' 0'
The result of the second Martin case has been to add further confusion to an already muddied area. 2 Subsequent cases relying upon
100 Id. at 98-99, 172 Pac. at 262.
101 Id. at 100, 172 Pac. at 262-63.
102
CROFT,

An analysis somewhat different from that presented here is found in 5 BAN"19. In Washington it
CODE PRACTIc
AND REMEDIES §4040 n.19 (1928):

appears originally to have been held that the question of jurisdiction was the sole
test of jurisdiction. That view was expressly overruled and it was said that the adequacy of the remedy and not the question of jurisdiction was the true test in determining whether prohibition would lie. State v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 111 Am.
St. Rep. 925, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 395, 82 Pac. 877 (expressly overruling all decisions
which make the question of jurisdiction the sole test as to the granting of the writ).
For some time the court adhered to this view. State v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 358,
L. R. A. 1917F, 905, 166 Pac. 630; State v. Clifford, 78 Wash. 555, 139 Pac. 650;
State v. Wright, 76 Wash. 383, 136 Pac. 482; State v. Superior Court, 73 Wash. 296,
131 Pac. 816; State v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 370, 121 Pac. 836. Subsequently,
the distinction was made that, when there is a lack of inherent jurisdiction in the
court itself, the writ of prohibition will issue regardless of the fact that there may be
another remedy, but that where the question is as to whether the court is acting within
the scope of its admitted jurisdiction, prohibition will not issue. State v. Superior
Court, 122 Wash. 555, 211 Pac. 764 (citing State v. Superior Court, 101 Wash. 81,
4 A.L.R. 572, 172 Pac. 257, which, however, was a case concerning mandamus and
not prohibition, and which does not appear to be, as maintained, a very thorough
review of the previous cases dealing with prohibition)."
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either the first

or the second'"' Martin cases have failed to dispel

any of the confusion. Two of the more recent cases of moment are
cited in State ex rel. Munro v. Superior Court:105
It is, of course, true that the writ of prohibition will only issue where
there is no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. State ex rel. New
York Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Wn. (2d) 834, 199 P. (2d)
581.... But where the court is attempting to proceed entirely without
jurisdiction, we have held that the remedy by appeal is inadequate and
prohibition will lie. State ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines
v. Superior Court, 26 Wn. (2d) 740, 175 P. (2d) 640.106

The phrase "entirely without jurisdiction" attributed to the Greyhound case is another of those cryptic expressions. It implies that in
other instances a court may be proceeding "somewhat without jurisdiction." Whether there are shades of lack of jurisdiction is questionable. It would seem that the court either has or has not the power to
act, and that by definition no middle ground exists.
To summarize, the following exceptions have been created to the
general rule that a writ will not issue unless the remedy by appeal is
inadequate: (1) When the question involves the legal existence or construction of the court;' 017 (2) When the court is proceeding without
first having acquired jurisdiction; 0 8 (3) When a statute grants a right
independent of the merits of the cause, and the facts are undisputed
with no element of discretion involved;' 0 9 (4) When the court is proceeding without "inherent jurisdiction"; 110 (5) When the court is proceeding "entirely without jurisdiction.""'
It is submitted that none of these exceptions, except perhaps the
first, finds any support in law, in reason, or in any sound judicial
policy. They have been the source of immeasurable confusion to the
bar, and they contribute to an overburdening of the appellate court
with applications for relief.
103 State ex rel. Antonsen v. Superior Court, 29 Wn2d 725, 189 P.2d 219 (1948)
State ex reL Western Canadian Greyhound Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 26 Wn.2d
740, 175 P2d 640 (1946); State ex r-el. Gamble v. Superior Court, 190 Wash. 127,
66 P.2d 1135 (1937) ; State ex r-el. Barks v. Superior Court, 144 Wash. 44, 257 Pac.
837 (1927); State ex rel. McClaskey v. Superior Court, 115 Wash. 354, 197 Pac.
30 (1921).

3104State ex relPark v. Superior Court, 142 Wash. 366, 253 Pac. 111 (1927);

State ex rel. Maurer v. Superior Court, 122 Wash. 555, 211 Pac. 764 (1922).
105 35 Wn.2d 217, 212 P.2d 493 (1949).
108 Id.at 221, 212 P.2d at 495.
107 State ex iel. Reed v. Jones, 2 Wash. 662, 27 Pac. 452 (1891).
103 State ex rel. Hopman v. Superior Court, 88 Wash. 612, 153 Pac. 315 (1915);
State ex tel. Wood v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 27, 135 Pac. 494 (1913).
109 State ex tel. Martin v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 358, 166 Pac. 630 (1917).
110 State ex tel. Martin v. Superior Court, 101 Wash 81 172 Pac. 257 (1918).

"'State ex rel. Munro v. Superior Court, 35 Wn0

04,212 P.2d 493 (1949);

czt
t: rrel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 26 Wn.2d
740, 175 P.2d 640 (1946).
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JURISDICTION

The statutes and cases require as a prerequisite to issuance of an
extraordinary writ that the trial court be acting without or in excess
of its jurisdiction. The task of the remainder of this article is to determine what is meant by "jurisdiction." To that end the best introduction is direct reference to the few general statements offered by
the Washington Supreme Court.

In State ex rel. New York Cas. Co. v. Superior Court... is found the
following:
Jurisdiction of the subject matter means not only authority in the
court to hear and determine the class of actions in which the particular
action is comprised, but also authority to hear and determine the particular question which it assumes to determine; hence the essential
elements of jurisdiction are said to be three: (1) the court must have
cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; (2) the proper parties must be present; and (3) the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issues before the
court.118
And in Graham v. Graham,"' where the trial court intended to appoint a guardian ad litem without conducting a hearing, the supreme
court said:
From the standpoint of definition, the term "jurisdiction" is somewhat illusive, to say the least. It has been characterized as one of the
nebulous, slippery, weasel words of the law. These observations would
seem to apply equally to the phrase "excess of jurisdiction." Clearcut,
authoritative definitions of the phrase are not too numerous. At best,
they are quite confusing. It was pointed out above that the trial court
definitely has jurisdiction or possesses the power to act in the matter
of appointment of guardians ad litem in the usual run-of-the-mill situation. Therefore, the question now to be resolved is whether it should
be said that the trial court, in proceeding without a hearing in the face
of timely objection and resistance, was acting in excess of jurisdiction.
For the reasons indicated, we have stated hereinabove that under certain circumstances a hearing and an opportunity to be heard are essential. Absent such essentials, we are convinced that a court would be
proceeding in excess of its jurisdiction."5
On the other hand, the supreme court declined to prohibit a supe"1 31 Wn.2d 834, 199 P.2d 581 (1948).
ILI Id. at 840, 199 P.2d at 585.
11440 Wn.2d 64, 240 P.2d 564 (1952).
115 Id. at 68-69, 240 P.2d at 566.
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rior court from considering a temporary injunction directed against
enforcement of a city ordinance in State ex rel. McGlothernv. Superior
Court:"'
The parties and the subject-matter are all before the superior court
by process and under general appearances. The immediate cause of the
controversy relates to an intermediate step or order in the progress of
the cause which the superior court has unquestioned power and jurisdiction to hear and determine....
Under the constitution and statutes, the superior courts of this state
have been given general jurisdiction. Jurisdiction means the power to
hear and determine. It is the power not to hear and determine correctly, nor the power to hear and determine incorrectly, but the power
to simply hear and determine; and if, in the face of all presumptions, a
litigant fears an erroneous ruling, it can in no sense disturb or defeat
the power of the court to hear and determine. In the progress of the
the superior court has the jurisdiccause towards the final judgment,
17
tion to reconsider its orders.

Similarly, in State ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford"' the supreme court declined to restrain the entry of an order for the exhumation of a body.
A couple of cases"l9 were overruled, and the court said: "The words
in the statute... 'in excess' of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, clearly
do not mean an error either in law or fact committed in the exercise
The following statement in the
of an acknowledged jurisdiction.'..
dissent to one of the overruled cases was quoted with approval:
To hold that a court of general jurisdiction exceeds that jurisdiction
every time it issues a writ or grants any other form of relief in an improper case or upon an improper showing, is to lose sight of all distinction between a want of jurisdiction and mere error in the exercise
of jurisdiction. Such a holding practically limits the term "jurisdiction" to the power to hear and determine rightly and without error.' 2 '
And finally in State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court,2 1 where the court

held that the superior court lost jurisdiction over a family allowance
which abated at the death of the widow, the following dissent was
registered:
Uniformity of the law (which is certainly a very desirable purpose
that ought to be considered if we would have other than an indifferent
110 112 Wash. 501, 192 Pac. 937 (1920).
"17 Id. at 504-05, 192 Pac. at 938-39.
11s

78 Wash. 555, 139 Pac. 650 (1914).

I'0 State ex rel. Murphy v. Wright, 76 Wash. 383, 136 Pac. 482 (1913); State
ex rel City of Puyallup v. Superior Court, 50 Wash. 650, 97 Pac. 778 (1908).
120 78 Wash. at 560, 139 Pac. at 651.
12X Ibid.

12223 Wn.2d 250, 160 P.2d 606 (1945).
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exposition of the law) no longer obtains. It would be a futile effort
to cite authorities in support of the rule that mere error is not a valid
basis for issuance of the writ in the case at bar, in view of the disposition of this court to follow the "modern trend" and aid in furtherance
of the program of a government of men not of laws."2"
Phrased in other terms, it should be concluded from the above statements that the trial court may function erroneously on some legal
questions with the result that the court is deprived of power to continue to hear and determine the cause, while it may function erroneously on other legal questions with the result constituting "mere
error." If the legal question under consideration falls into the former
category, the matter is jurisdictional and meets one of the requirements for review by extraordinary writ. If it falls into the latter category, review must await appeal from the final judgment. This part of
the article seeks to determine what type legal questions are jurisdictional.
The cases defining and applying the jurisdictional requirement for
issuance of a writ are so diverse and superficial as to defy classification and analysis. The area is further complicated by the fact that
the court has on occasion intimated a distinction between "lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter" and "excess of jurisdiction" while
in most of the cases one or the other phrase is used without apparent
regard for the distinction (if indeed there is any meaningful distinction). In this state of the case law the most profitable treatment is a
discussion of the cases in groups even though the connection among
all the cases in each group may not always be as neat and clean as
might otherwise be desired.
However, before concluding this introductory presentation, attention must be directed to the cases involving questions of fact. The general rule is that a writ will not lie when jurisdiction depends upon a
disputed question of fact.'2 4 The stated reason for this rule is that an
application for a writ does not always bring up a complete record to
the appellate court, and therefore, it is not a proper mode of review
for factual questions. 5 It might be suggested as an even more compelling reason that the supreme court will not retry factual disputes. 6
But what are factual questions? In some writ cases matters de12sId. at 254, 160 P.2d at 609.
"2, Sheffield v. Eagle Lion Films, 40 Wn.2d 361, 242 P.2d 1024 (1952) ; State
656 (1915) ; State ex rel. Baldwin
172, 149
Wash.
v. Kauffman,
ex
rel. Neal Court,
39 Pac.
818 Pac.
(1895).
11 Wash.86 111,
v. Superior
S125Sheffield v. Eagle Lion Films, 40 Wn.2d
361, 242 P.2d 1024 (1952).
126 See Gilbert v. Rogers, 156 Wash. Dec. 184, 351 P.2d 535 (1960).
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nominated questions of fact seem in reality to be questions of law.
For example, the residence of a decedent at the time of her death, 2 "
the propriety of service of summons,2" the construction of a lease and
a guaranty, 2" and whether a case had been merely stricken instead of
dismissed,3 0 have been termed questions of fact.' Without engaging
in a dissection of these holdings it must be observed that particularly
in view of the surrounding circumstances set out in each case the questions before the court probably were legal, not factual.
Closely related to the cases involving questions of fact are those
stating that a trial court passing on the question of its own jurisdiction is only exercising its "judicial function," and if error is committed, the proper remedy is by appeal, not by writ.'3 2 Under this rule,
if taken literally, questions of jurisdiction could never be reviewed by
writ because (1) the "judicial function" includes both questions of
law and of fact, and (2) a writ application will not be entertained
unless the question has previously been considered by the trial court.'
However, the multitude of cases attest to the fact that jurisdictional
questions may be reviewed by writ. In view of this it is submitted
that "judicial function" is merely an unfortunate selection of words
referring to determination of questions of fact. If this be the meaning, the rule is nothing more than another way of stating that the
supreme court will not retry factual disputes.
A convenient point of departure into the specific subjects in this
area is the case of State ex rel. Dodge v. Langkorne.3 " There a witness for the prevailing party in the action sought by petition to have
a judgment set aside so that he might recover the witness fee that had
been awarded to the prevailing party as part of the judgment, but
which the party had not paid to the witness. The trial court intended
to hold the party in contempt for failure to comply with its orders
pursuant to the petition. Held, that the trial court had no power to
hear and determine the cause, the witness having failed to state a cause
of action because he was not a party to the suit. Therefore, the writ
127 State ex rel. Baldwin v.-Superior Court, 11 Wash. 111, 39 Pac. 818 (1895).
128 Sheffield v. Eagle Lion Films, 40 Wn.2d 361, 242 P2d 1024 (1952).

129 Ibid.
130 State ex rel. O'Brien v. Police Court, 14 Wn.2d 340, 128 P2d 332 (1942).
31

1 On the other hand jurisdiction over an interstate bus company by service upon
a driver was held not to be a question of fact in State ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 26 Wn2d 740, 175 P.2d 640 (1946).
132 See State ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines Ltd. v. Superior Court,
26 Wn.2d 740, 754, 175 P.2d 640, 648 (1946), and cases cited therein.
133 State ex rel. Nooksack River Boom Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Wash. 9, 25 Pac.

1007 (1891).
2s'12

Wash. 588, 41 Pac. 917 (1895).
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of prohibition issued. During the course of the opinion the supreme
court made the following remarks:
Even if it be conceded that in this instance, the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the relator, it does not follow, according to the principles laid down in the above authorities, that it had the
right or power to make the order which it is attempting to enforce.
In fact, it appears that the court clearly transcended its power in making the order. It assumed to act without the filing of a complaint and
to determine without investigation or proof. This was an attempt to
give effect to the will of the court, rather than that of the law. When the
court struck out the answer of the relator, which was certainly relevant and material, as it was in effect a plea to the jurisdiction of the
court, it committed error, and when it entered an order without a hearing its act was contrary to a fundamental principle of law. We have
seen that in order to try and determine a controversy the defendant
must be brought before the court by some process known to the statute.
In this case that was not done.13 5
The opinion suggests several reasons to sustain the holding that the
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. Among them are (1) that the
petition failed to state a cause of action, or (2) that the order was
entered without a hearing, or (3) that if the court had jurisdiction, it
transcended its power. Other cases dealing with these reasons will be
discussed in the sections immediately following.

Failure To State a Claim. Notwithstanding the apparent position
of the Dodge case, it would seem that failure to state a claim is a matter of defense, not jurisdiction, and a couple of cases have adopted
that view. In State ex rel. Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Superior
Court13 the plaintiffs sought enforcement of a lien upon packed fish
under Alaska law. The trial court overruled a demurrer which was
based on the ground that such a lien was unenforceable in this state.
The supreme court declined to restrain the trial court from proceeding,
holding that the objection did not go to jurisdiction, but to the sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action.
To the same effect is the following dictum in State ex rel. Prentice
v. Superior Court,1 " in which the supreme court declined to prohibit
modification of a judgment more than one year after its entry.
It may be that the prior judgment of the superior court is res judicata
of the questions sought to be raised by cross-complaint in the new suit.
135 Id. at 594-95, 41 Pac. at 919.
136 162 Vash. 377, 298 Pac. 716 (1931).
137 86 Wash. 90, 149 Pac. 321 (1915).
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It may be that the cross-complaint for other reasons states no cause of
action. The trial court, however, has jurisdiction of the subject-matter
and of the parties. Its judgment, if reviewable at all, is adequately reviewable by appeal. To grant the writ on the record here would warrant the entertainment of prohibition as a short cut
for reviewing
38
judgments of the superior court in almost any case.1
And finally, the dictum in State ex rel. Chin v. Superior Court". in
support of a holding that a defective information does not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction: "This information may, or may not, be defective, but it is not void. It is no more void than if it were attacked
on the ground that it fails to state a crime, or that it states two or
more crimes."' 4"
However, in a few related cases the court seemingly has adopted the
contrary position without much discussion of the matter. In State ex
rel. Mower v. Superior Court' a metropolitan park district sought to
condemn certain land. It was held that the district had no capacity
to sue and consequently the superior court had no jurisdiction. But
does this necessarily follow? The superior court had jurisdiction over
the parties and over condemnation cases as a class. Is not lack of
capacity to sue something akin to the defense of failure to state a
claim? Do whatever differences exist justify the position that one is
jurisdictional and the other is not?
Perhaps closer in point is State ex rel. Lang v. Superior Court,'4 '
where the trial court was restrained from enforcing a property settlement by proceedings in contempt. The opinion assumes that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to take such action. Yet, the court had jurisdiction over the parties and over contempt proceedings as a class.
Therefore, it may be argued with some force that this should have
been denominated merely a failure to state a claim for relief by contempt.
Also, in State ex rel. Munro v. Superior Court.4 prohibition issued
against a trial court which intended to restrain a prosecuting attorney
from instituting an action for trespass. The court said:
A writ of prohibition may issue to prevent a court from granting an
injunction where, though having jurisdiction for certain limited purposes, it would, in doing so, go beyond such jurisdiction....
Before the court can take cognizance of an application for an injunc138 Id.at 98, 149 Pac. at 324.

'o139 Wash. 449, 247 Pac. 738 (1926).
at 451, 247 Pac. at 739.

140 Id.
14143
'42
143

Wn.2d 123, 260 P.2d 355 (1953).
176 Wash. 472, 30 P.2d 237 (1934).
35 Wn.2d 217, 212 P.2d 493 (1949).

TJASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

tion, it should be made to appear, from the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, that it is one in which equitable interposition may
properly and legitimately be invoked ....

Where no special circum-

stances are alleged bringing the case under some recognized head of
equity jurisdiction, the court has no authority to hear and determine
1 44
the case, and a writ will issue to prevent its granting injunctive relief.
Here again the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties and over
equity cases as a class. The opinion seems to say that there was a
failure to state a claim for relief in equity. If this is so, it also should
have been treated as a matter of defense, not jurisdiction, and the
writ should not have issued.
The Munro case was relied upon to restrain a superior court from
temporarily enjoining a legislative committee investigation of local
crime conditions in State ex rel. Hodde v. Superior Court.4" Here,
however, the court split five to four with a dissenting opinion making
strong objection to issuance of a writ under these circumstances. The
dissent states:
I am of the opinion that the writ of prohibition should be denied
because the superior court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject matter of the action. It is not threatening to act either without
jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The question whether, under the showing made in the trial court, an
injunction pendente lite should issue in the form contemplated involves
the merits of the controversy and may be reviewed by us only upon
appeal or application for a writ of certiorari.
Assuming, without deciding, that the superior court is threatening
to commit error by entering the proposed injunction, this court has
several times stated that it will not issue a writ of prohibition to pre1 46
vent the commission of error.

It is to be hoped that when the question next arises, the court will
give due consideration to the position expounded in this dissenting
opinion.
Lack of a Hearing. The few cases that have considered the question have taken the position that entry of an order without providing
opportunity for a hearing may be an act in excess of jurisdiction. In
addition to the Dodge case, attention is directed to the quotation at
the beginning of this section from Graham v. Graham, in which the
superior court was restrained from appointing a guardian ad litem
144Id.

at 220, 212 P.2d at 495.

145 40 Wn.2d 502, 244 P.2d 668 (1952).
146

Id. at 518, 244 P.2d at 676.
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without a hearing. Likewise, in State ex rel. Skaggs v. Smith1 4 it was
held that the superior court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in determining without notice to relator that an institution was in fact open
for business. Since there was no question in the Skaggs case of the
court's jurisdiction over the relator, the holding must mean that it was
the failure to afford the opportunity to be heard that resulted in the
entry of an order in excess of jurisdiction.
As recognized in the Graham case, failure to provide a hearing will
not necessarily result in an excess of jurisdiction in all cases. Since
the court has not provided any guidelines for the determination of
what circumstances must be present for an excess of jurisdiction to
occur, the question is far from settled. Nevertheless, as far as they
go, these cases have the virtue of consistency seldom found in this field.
Transcending the Jurisdiction of the Court. One facet of the
Dodge case remains to be explored. It is the argument that even assuming that the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter, it transcended its power in entering the particular
order in question. Only one other case has been found in which the
court discussed in haec verba the question whether the trial court
"transcended" its power. And there it was apparently held that such
1 4 s However,
action was not tantamount to an excess of jurisdiction.
a number of cases have met the problem, only in terms of "excess of
jurisdiction" or "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter."'
Before examining these cases it is important to recognize a couple
of rather fundamental distinctions among factual situations falling
under the headings of "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter"
or "excess of jurisdiction." First, are those cases in which there is
some tangible property which is the "subject matter" of the action.
If the property is geographically beyond the reach of the court, then
"jurisdiction over the subject matter" is lacking. For example, it has
been held that the court lacked jurisdiction to determine the right to
possession of land in Alaska,14 and lacked jurisdiction over a fund
located in another county. 50
Second, are those cases arising in courts of limited jurisdiction in
which the court acts in "excess of its jurisdiction." If, for example,
the court of first instance is not empowered to hear cases in which the
147 116 Wash. 572, 200 Pac. 92 (1921).
1.48 State ex rel. Nelms. v. Superior Court, 149 Wash. 50, 270 Pac. 128 (1928).
149 Alaska Airlines v. Molitor, 43 Wn.2d 657, 263 P.2d 276 (1953).
150 City of North Yakima v. Superior Court, 4 Wash. 655, 30 Pac. 1053 (1892).
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amount of recovery exceeds $100, an attempt to hear such a case
would constitute an act in "excess of jurisdiction..... Or if the action
is commenced as the special statutory summary proceeding for unlawful detainer, the trial court exceeds its jurisdiction in granting
general relief not specified in the statute.' - This problem has seldom
arisen because the superior courts in this state are courts of general
jurisdiction." 3
The problem which has presented itself is that of the superior court
entering an order or judgment wholly outside the class under consideration. An absurd hypothetical example is the entry of a divorce
decree in favor of one of the parties at the conclusion of an automobile accident case. The observation must be made at this point that
the realm of absurdity is not necessarily coextensive with the realm
of jurisdiction. An absurd ruling is not per se in excess of jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the supreme court has quite often held that
such action by a trial court is in excess of its jurisdiction.
Hence, in the Dodge case itself the trial court in insolvency proceedings was prohibited from granting relief to a witness seeking his
witness fee from a party to the action. Similarly, prohibition has been
granted to prevent a trial court from adjudicating as part of a divorce
action the legal fee to which plaintiff's counsel might be entitled from
plaintiff,' or from appointing an administrator where a will previously had been admitted to probate. 5 '
In a criminal case,' 56 where the jury had found the defendant not
guilty by reason of insanity and unsafe to be at large, the trial court
was prohibited from undertaking to determine for itself whether the
defendant was unsafe to be at large. The supreme court explained
this holding as follows: "One of three essential elements which must
be present to establish jurisdiction of a court in any case is that the
151 State cx rel. Egbert v. Superior Court, 9 Wash. 369, 37 Pac. 489 (1894) ; cf.
State ex rel. Murphy v. Taylor, 101 Wash. 148, 172 Pac. 217 (1918).
152 State ex rel. Seaborn Shipyards Co. v. Superior Court, 102 Wash. 215, 172
Pac. 826 (1918).
15 See RCW 2.08.010. Of course, even a court of general jurisdiction may lack
jurisdiction in any given case as the result of failure to comply with technical requirements. State ex rel. Edwards v. Superior Court, 37 Wn.2d 8, 221 P.2d 518
(1950) ; State ex rel. Fleischner v. Superior Court, 20 Wash. 709, 54 Pac. 937 (1898) ;
State x rel. Alladio v. Superior Court, 17 Wash. 54, 48 Pac. 733 (1897). Or, the
cause may present a political, rather than a judicial, question. State ex rel. Maurer
v. Superior Court, 122 Wash. 555, 211 Pac. 764 (1922) (canvassing election returns).
But see State ex reL. Cann v. Moore, 23 Wash. 115, 62 Pac. 441 (1900) (proceedings
of political convention).
15' State ex rel. Arthur v. Superior Court, 58 Wash. 97, 107 Pac. 876 (1910).
155 In re Guye's Estate, 54 Wash. 264, 103 Pac. 25 (1909).
156 State v. Durham, 39 Wn.2d 781, 238 P.2d 1201 (1951).
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point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issues before
the court."' 5
A slightly different explanation was offered in an early case"58 where
it was held to be an excess of jurisdiction to insist that an attorney
apologize for contempt of court as a condition to his right to appear
before the court. To the argument that the trial court had jurisdiction over the attorney and the subject matter, the supreme court made
this answer:
This contention is doubtless correct, if the orders entered were such
as, under any state of facts connected with the proceedings, the law
would authorize. We think, however, that the latter part of the said
first order, if it required anything at all more than the payment of the
fine mentioned in said order, required something which the court had
no right, under any circumstances, to order .... 159

Here at least the bar has been furnished with an intelligible and
workable rule. To be sure, borderline factual situations will arise in
which application of the rule will prove a difficult task, but in this
regard it differs not from rules of law in general.
In the remaining sections discussion will be directed to other fact
patterns which have prompted judicial pronouncements on the question whether the trial court is exceeding its jurisdiction. In general,
the problem will continue to be whether the defect in the proceedings
deprives the court of power to act, or whether such defect is a mere
matter of error.
Moot Issues. Our state supreme court has never squarely faced
the question whether mootness is a jurisdictional defect. However,
extraordinary writs have been issued on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter in a number of cases where the fact
pattern suspiciously resembles a case of moot issues. For example,
it was held that a trial court lost jurisdiction of a divorce action upon
the death of the wife, 6 ' lost jurisdiction of a creditor's claim upon the
death of an incompetent debtor even though the guardian of the debtor
remained before the court,'' and lost jurisdiction of a family allowance matter upon the death of the widow. 2
Id. at 784, 238 P.2d at 1203.
158 State ex reL. Rohde v. Sachs, 2 Wash. 373, 26 Pac. 865 (1891).

'57
5

Id. at 375, 26 Pac. at 866.
State ex tel. National Bank of Commerce v. Frater, 18 Wn.2d 546, 140 P.2d
272 (1943).
162 State x reL Case v. Superior Court. 23 Wn.2d 250, 160 ,P.2d 606 (1945).
1 9

160 State ex rel. Atldns v. Superior Court, 1 Wn.2d 677, 97 P.2d 139 (1939).
161
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Little fault could be found with these holdings if the courts of this
state were without power to hear and determine moot cases. But such
is not the situation. Although as a general rule the courts will only
entertain truly adversary proceedings and will not engage in advisory
litigation, this apparently is not a jurisdictional matter because on at
least one occasion the supreme court has undertaken to decide a case
notwithstanding that the questions involved had become moot. 3 Consequently, it must be concluded that the supreme court has erred in
interfering with the orderly course of trials where the matter may
have become moot.
Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy. Only a few cases have been
found in which the question, either explicitly or implicitly, was
whether double jeopardy or res judicata was jurisdictional for the purposes of issuance of an extraordinary writ.
State ex rel. Prentice v. Superior Court... includes the off-hand statement of that court that res judicata would not be a jurisdictional matter. However, in the closely related area of double jeopardy the cases
have come to the opposite conclusion with no effort whatever to justify such holdings.
Thus, a writ was granted to prohibit a trial court from vacating a
judgment and sentence so that it could be shown that a more heinous
offense had been perpetrated, and therefore a greater punishment imposed. 5 Similarly, a trial court was barred by writ from proceeding
on a charge after an identical charge against the same defendant had
been dismissed in the justice court. 6
It is easy to understand the desire of the supreme court in criminal
matters to save the defendant the agony of suffering a criminal prosecution needlessly. But here, as elsewhere, the orderly administration
of justice would seem to dictate that such questions be left in the
hands of the trial judge without interlocutory interference by the appellate court.
Noncompliance with Time Limitations. Does the failure to comply
with a time limitation deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear
a matter? In State ex rel. Teeter v. Superior Court6 it was held that
163 State ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 192 Wash. 179, 73

P.2d 759 (1937).

86 Wash. 90, 149 Pac. 321 (1915).
165 State ex rel. Plumb v. Superior Court, 24 Wn.2d 510, 166 P.2d 188 (1946).
166 State ex rel. Harger v. Chapman, 131 Wash. 581, 230 Pac. 833 (1924).
167 110 Wash. 255, 188 Pac. 391 (1920).
164
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the general statute of limitations is a mere matter of defense, and not
jurisdictional. Unfortunately, this sound ruling has not been consistently adhered to in other cases involving time limitations. For instance, it has been held that prohibition would lie since the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to consider a supplementary affidavit filed after the
five-day statutory time limit had expired,168 or to proceed in a will
contest which was not commenced within the required one-year period," 9 or to vacate a judgment more than one year after it was entered."' It is difficult to understand why these special statutory time
requirements are jurisdictional while the general statute of limitations
is not.
Even more puzzling is the action of the court in State ex rel. Prentice
v. Superior Court'. where it was held that prohibition would not lie
to prevent modification of a decree more than one year after its entry
because such is a matter of error, not excess of jurisdiction. The will
contest case 7 2 was distinguished on the ground that it was based upon
a "special statute," and the prior vacation of judgment case 7s was
distinguished on the ground that certiorari, not prohibition, was there
granted. This attempt to explain, rather than overrule, the prior erroneous holdings was both an unfortunate and an unsuccessful effort.
In the first place, it is not easy to comprehend the meaning and significance of the suggested distinction of a "special statute." What
makes the will contest statute a special statute? If the answer is that
it applies only to a particular class of cases, why does this fact make
the time limit jurisdictional? If there be an answer to this last question, it was incumbent upon the court to state it for the edification of
the bar.
As for the attempted explanation of the prior vacation of judgment
case on the ground that it was a writ of certiorari, all that can be said
is that it simply is not so. A reading of that case makes it abundantly
clear that a writ of prohibition was considered and granted. The court
in the Prentice case would have done a service if it had expressly overruled the prior inconsistent cases. Its failure to do so, or to adequately
distinguish them, leaves the question in a state of uncertainty.
State ex tel. Mills v. Superior Court, 149 Wash. 473, 271 Pac. 333 (1928).
State ex rel. Wood v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 27, 135 Pac. 494 (1913).
0
17 State ex tel. Pacific Loan & Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 84 Wash. 392, 146
Pac. 834 (1915) ; accord, State ex iel. Boyle v. Superior Court, 19 Wash. 128, 52 Pac.
1013 (1898).
17186
Wash. 90, 149 Pac. 321 (1915).
2
"7 State ex rel. Wood v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 27, 135 Pac. 494 (1913).
178 State ex tel. Pacific Loan & Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 84 Wash. 392, 146
Pac. 834 (1915).
168
160
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Lack of Jurisdiction over the Person. Although jurisdiction over
the parties to the action is one of the least confused areas in this field,
it is far from clear. In several cases irregular or improper service of
summons has been recognized as a jurisdictional defect to sustain resort to review by extraordinary writ.Y7 In other cases it has been
stated that insufficency of service of summons is merely error occurring in the course of the trial which may be reviewed on appeal, and
therefore a writ will not lie.1 75 This latter group of cases is difficult
to explain or defend except to suggest that the court was merely careless in its use of language, and that the real holdings were that the
writ would not lie because the remedy at law was adequate or because76
the question of sufficiency of service rested on controverted facts.1
To the extent that these cases cannot be so explained they must be in
error because the failure to bring a party within the reach of the court
is unquestionably a jurisdictional defect.
Improper Venue. The question is whether matters of venue are
reviewable by extraordinary writ. RCW 4.12.025 provides that an
action may be brought in any county in which the defendant resides,
and that the residence of a corporation shall be deemed to be in any
county where the corporation transacts business. It has consistently
been held that these statutory requirements are jurisdictional.7 In
some cases however the court has sustained the use of the extraordinary writ not so much on the ground that venue is jurisdictional but
on the ground that a writ is the proper mode of procedure to review
a matter which is "independent of the merits."' 78 This latter rationale
174

State ex rel. Barks v. Superior Court, 144 Wash. 44, 257 Pac. 837 (1927)

(service on Sunday) ; State ex rel. Hopman v. Superior Court, 88 Wash. 612, 153
Pac. 315 (1915) (noncompliance with statute) ; State ex rel. Nolte v. Superior
Court, 15 Wash. 500, 46 Pac. 1031 (1896); State ex rel. Boyd v. Superior Court,
6 Wash. 352, 33 Pac. 827 (1893).
175 State ex rel. Park v. Superior Court, 142 Wash. 366, 253 Pac. 111 (1927)
State ex rel. Teeter v. Superior Court, 110 Wash. 255, 188 Pac. 391 (1920).
176 See Sheffield v. Eagle Lion Films, 40 Wn.2d 361, 242 P.2d 1024 (1952) ; State
ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 26 Wn.2d 740,
175 P.2d 640 (1946).
177Corporation: State ex rel. Verd v. Superior Court, 31 Wn.2d 625, 198 P.2d
663 (1948); State ex rel Yakima Trust Co. v. Mills, 140 Wash. 357, 249 Pac. 8

(1926); State ex reL Seattle Nat'l. Bank v. Joiner, 138 Wash. 212, 244 Pac. 551
(1926); State ex rel. Grays Harbor Comm'n. Co. v. Superior Court, 118 Wash. 674,
204 Pac. 783 (1922). Individuals: State ex reL. Poussier v. Superior Court, 98 Wash.
565, 168 Pac. 164 (1917) ; State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82
Pac. 877 (1905) ; State ex rel. Cummings v. Superior Court, 5 Wash. 518, 32 Pac.
457 (1893) (overruled on other grounds).
178 State ex reL Hand v. Superior Court, 191 Wash. 98, 71 P.2d 24 (1937) ; State
ex rel. Gamble v. Superior Court, 190 Wash. 127, 66 P.2d 1135 (1937) ; State ex rel.
Martin v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 358, 166 Pac. 630 (1917).

19611

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW

has given rise to a much wider utilization of writs to review questions
of venue which are not so clearly jurisdictional.
For example, the granting or denial of a change of venue for the
convenience of witnesses has been reviewed by writ on the ground that
although this question ordinarily is one of discretion (not jurisdiction),'" a writ will lie to prevent any abuse of discretion or any arbitrary or capricious action. 8 The cases do not indicate whether the
granting of the writ is based upon the ground that abusing discretion
is tantamount to acting in excess of jurisdiction or on the ground that
the matter is "independent of the merits."
A very strong argument could be made that such abuse of discretion is not jurisdictional in view of the fact that the court clearly has
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, and the point decided
is, in substance and effect, within the issues before the court. In any
event, a change of venue for the convenience of witnesses is certainly
a matter "independent of the merits" and therefore reviewable by writ
as the law now stands.
In much the same way, the more recent cases have permitted use
of a writ to compel a change of venue on the ground of prejudice of
the trial judge.'
This development in the case law prompted the following dictum
in State ex rel. Antonsen v. Superior Court: 2
It also, in the course of time, became evident that, in many cases,
questions concerning the venue of an action which did not involve
jurisdictional matters should, when decided by the superior court, be
promptly reviewed by this court so that the forum before which the
action should be tried might be definitely determined prior to the opening of the trial.188
The principal justification for preliminary appellate review by writ
of nonjurisdictional venue matters seems to have been that they are
"independent of the merits." This is hardly an adequate reason for
ignoring the statutory requirement of absence or excess of jurisdiction as a prerequisite for issuance of a writ. And why should this
179 See RCW 4.12.030.
180 State ex rel. Nielson v.

Superior Court, 7 Wn.2d 562, 110 P.2d 645 (1941);
State ex reL. Beffa v. Superior Court, 3 Wn.2d 184, 100 P.2d 6 (1940) ; State ex reL
Schmidt v. Nevins, 180 Wash. 356, 39 P.2d 990 (1935). But cf. State ex reL. Electric
Prods. Consol. v. Superior Court, 10 Wn. 2d 517, 117 P.2d 201 (1941).
181 State ex rel. Mauerman v. Superior Court, 44 Wn.2d 828, 271 P.2d 435 (1954);
State ex reL. Dunham v. Superior Court, 106 Wash. 507, 180 Pac. 481 (1919) ; cf.
State ex rel. Nelson v. Yakey, 64 Wash. 511, 117 Pac. 265 (1911). Contra, State
ex rel. Lyon v. Police Court, 53 Wash. 361, 101 Pac. 1082 (1909).
182 29 Wn.2d 725, 189 P.2d 219 (1948).
183 Id. at 729, 189 P.2d at 221. The statement is dictum because the case involved
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practice, if proper, be limited to venue matters? The trial court is
called upon to make numerous determinations "independent of the
merits" prior to trial. Why should they not also be reviewed by extraordinary writ? The answer, and it applies to venue as well as nonvenue matters, is that this would result in multiple, piecemeal appeals.
It might be argued that venue matters are sui generis in that an
error of venue nullifies the entire trial, while an error in some other
preliminary matter would not have such a sweeping effect. This distinction is more theoretical than real because in most cases any prejudicial error by the trial court will require a retrial of the entire matter.
If the judicial policy against multiple, piecemeal appeals is to be retained, preliminary appellate review of nonjurisdictional venue matters should be discontinued.
Loss of Jurisdiction upon Appeal. A somewhat different situation
exists when questioning the jurisdiction of a trial court upon appeal
of a cause. Here the concern is not with the power of the trial court
over the parties or over a given class of cases but with its power to
act in the particular cause under consideration. Under these circumstances the supreme court has uniformly held that the trial court may
not act on the matter unless specifically so directed by the appellate
court. Thus, trial courts have been restrained from holding parties in
contempt for failure to obey an order pending appeal,"" from reconsidering sufficiency of bond pending appeal,18 from entering an order
beyond the scope of the remittitur upon remand, 8 ' and from vacating
or modifying a judgment subsequent to determination of the appeal. 7
There can be no quarrel with the result of these holdings by the
supreme court. It is suggested however that recourse to the rules governing issuance of extraordinary writs is both unnecessary and inappropriate in this type of case. The original jurisdiction of the appellate court is not in question, but rather its revisory jurisdiction. In
such a case it is irrelevant to ask whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or for that matter whether
the remedy at law is adequate. The real and sole test is whether the
action by the trial court threatens to undermine the appellate power
of the reviewing court. If so, the trial court must be restrained, but
change of venue to the county of defendant's residence, which is jurisdictional.
184 State ex rel. Mangaoang v. Superior Court, 30 Wn.2d 692, 193 P.2d 318 (1948)
State ex rel. Maslan v. Pierce, 175 Wash. 676, 28 P.2d 109 (1933).
185 State ex rel. Schloss v. Superior Court, 3 Wash. 696, 29 Pac. 202 (1892).
186 State ex reL. Waterman v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 37, 220 Pac. 5 (1923).
187 State ex rel. Wolferman v. Superior Court, 8 Wash. 591, 36 Pac. 443 (1894).
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the basis of such restraint is the inherent power of the appellate court
to protect and preserve its revisory jurisdiction. In at least one early
writ case the court recognized that its holding was "necessary for the
due protection and enforcement of the powers vested in this court by
'
Yet, notwithstanding this realization the court
the constitution."188
went on to consider whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction .and
whether there was an adequate remedy at law. The result of such an
approach was, and will continue to be, the unnecessary consideration
of the irrelevant question whether an extraordinary writ should issue.
CONCLUSION

It must be abundantly clear that the state of the case law in this
field is such that a strong supportive holding may be found for either
side of most questions concerning jurisdiction or adequacy of the remedy at law. Add to this the apparent holdings in some cases that
"'mere error" may constitute an excess of jurisdiction and the apparent
holdings that in some circumstances adequacy of the remedy at law
need not be considered, and it is easy to understand why so many
counsel are encouraged to seek a writ as a mode of interlocutory appellate review.
It has become fashionable at this point in a law review article to
launch a blistering attack against the supreme court for its intellectual shortcomings which have resulted in, and are manifested by, the
unfortunate state of the law in the field under consideration. An alternative approach has been to assume a patronizing attitude toward
the overworked or otherwise handicapped jurists. Neither of these
avenues can fairly be followed here.
If fault must be assigned, it falls to a great extent upon the bar.
The reason is this. In most cases both counsel are more than willing
to have an interlocutory appellate determination of some question
arising prior to or during trial; this practice reduces the chances of
reversal on appeal and retrial. (Of course, this convenience is provided at the expense of other litigants awaiting appellate review in
the normal course. There are just so many cases that the supreme
court can hear in a term.) As a consequence, the briefing on the question of the propriety of the writ very often falls far short of perfection. This is not so much a matter of conscious, affirmative irresponsibility of counsel as an inability to generate sufficient zeal under the
circumstances to unravel the confusion extant among the decisions.
.88 Id. at 594, 36 Pac. at 444.
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One other very practical factor contributes to these deficiencies in
the law, and here the judiciary must be held answerable in part. In
most cases the questions of the propriety of the writ and the merits of
the controversy are considered at the same time. If the appellate judge
becomes convinced that the trial court is in error on the merits, the
temptation is great to so decide forthwith and thereby avoid a useless trial and a second appellate review of the same issue. This is the
origin and the basis of the argument: "If we would have to so hold
on appeal, why not say so now?" The answer to this argument (as
discussed at greater length in the body of this article) is that it may
be applied to every interlocutory ruling or order by a trial court, and
whatever may be the apparent immediate advantages of piecemeal
determinations, it is beyond cavil that such practices in the long run
impose an undue burden upon the judicial process.
Finally, it must be observed that writ matters usually do not receive the same due deliberation accorded by the supreme court to
other questions. The reason is that the bar has come to expect, and
usually receives, a speedy decision on such matters. Moreover, sometimes the circumstances themselves demand a speedy decision to prevent irreparable harm.
The sad state of the care law demands remedial action. What remedies are available? And will they solve the problem?
It might be suggested that the propriety of the writ be determined
at a preliminary hearing completely separate from, and without regard
to, the merits of the matter."' Such a procedure would be ineffective
for two reasons. First, in most instances the question of jurisdiction
and the "merits" are closely related, if indeed they are not the same
question. That is to say, the trial court's act or omission to which the
petitioner objects usually is the same act or omission on which the
question of jurisdiction rests. In such cases, of course, it is not possible as a practical matter to separate consideration of the "merits"
and availability of the writ. Second, writ matters often require speedy
decision which cannot be accomplished if two separate hearings are
necessary.
189 Such is the present procedure on writs of certiorari, except that the decision
whether the writ is available is made by the Chief Justice, not by the court. Under
Rule on Appeal 57 (1955) the Chief Justice may (1) decide that the writ is available,
or (2) decide that the writ is not available, or (3) continue the hearing to a motion
day to be decided by the court. This last option is the obvious choice in close cases.
Under present practice the continued hearing on the availability of the writ is conqidered by the court at the same time as the hearing on the merits. Hence, in most
close cases the propriety of the writ and the merits of the matter ultimately are
considered together.
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It might be suggested that the supreme court publish a rule of court
stating clearly that writs will not issue in these cases unless the trial
court is acting without jurisdiction and the remedy at law is inadequate. Such a rule holds little promise of success because it could state
nothing more than the present statutes, which have either been ignored or circumvented in many cases.
It might be suggested that at the earliest opportunity the supreme
court issue a definitive decision overruling the numerous erroneous
cases and announcing that henceforth the court will rigorously adhere
to the requirements of the statutes. If the past is any criterion, this
also holds little promise of success. In a couple of the cases discussed
in the body of this article the court produced exhaustive opinions in
an effort to reestablish the "correct procedure." The existing state
of the law attests to the fact that such efforts have failed.
There is no magical panacea for these ills. The antidote is judicial
self-restraint and self-discipline in the face of "hardship" cases where
the natural desire to see "justice done now" threatens to impinge upon
the more important policy against piecemeal appeals.

